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The 9/11 Commission report described how driver’s licenses, identification cards 
and travel documents are as important as weapons to terrorists.  Vulnerabilities in 
existing identification systems provide the opportunity for illegal immigrants and 
terrorists to obtain driver’s licenses and identification cards and once obtained these 
individuals can easily operate within the borders of United States.  In response to the 9/11 
Commission report, the federal government passed the REAL ID Act of 2005 (RIA), 
which established national standards for driver’s licenses and identification card 
standards. But moving forward with implementing the RIA using the current defined 
standards may not be effective in addressing terrorism concerns.  The RIA’s guidelines 
require states to use a digital photograph on driver’s licenses and identification cards as 
the primary biometric for identification.  Photographs can be misleading because a 
person’s physical appearance can change drastically due to hair loss, weight gain or 
change in hair color, making it difficult for law enforcement, Customs and Border Patrol 
officers and Transportation Security Administration personnel to positively identify 
individuals.  Improvements in biometric technology allow for the incorporation of 
fingerprint, iris scan, hand geometry or detailed facial feature information in driver’s 
license and identification card systems, and this thesis argues that incorporation of 
additional biometrics in driver’s licenses and identification cards would improve national 
security.  This thesis adds to the national identification card debate through an analysis of 
the RIA, an examination of the biometric identification technologies best suited for 
national security and border security purposes and an assessment of alternative biometric 
driver’s license and identification cards.   
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A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to review approaches to improving national security 
through better driver’s licenses and identification cards.  State-issued driver’s licenses 
and identification cards are the most common form of identification used in the United 
States; typical uses include evidence that the holder has driving privileges, identity 
verification, age verification, address verification and automated administrative 
processing for government databases.1  The lack of consistent driver’s license and 
identification card standards among the states poses a problem when defending the U.S. 
from a possible terrorist attack. The success of federal, state and local agencies in 
protecting the U.S. from terrorist attack is in part dependent upon the ability of law 
enforcement agencies to effectively distinguish between citizens, legal residents, and 
those who may be in the U.S. illegally. 
The 9/11 Commission Report recognized that driver’s licenses, identification 
cards and travel documents are as important as weapons to terrorists.2  Vulnerabilities in 
the existing identification systems provide the opportunity for illegal immigrants and 
terrorists to operate within the borders of the United States.  Three of the five hijackers 
who crashed a plane into the Pentagon used fraudulently-obtained driver’s licenses to 





                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601–AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008. 14. 
2 Jean Merserve and Mike Ahlers. 9/11 Commission Members Act to Finally Wrap it up, July 25, 2009. 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/07/25/new.antiterror.group/index.html (accessed July 25, 2009). 
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states.3  As stated by the 9/11 Commission, establishing and implementing national 
standards for driver’s licenses and identification cards is a critical component to 
improving homeland security.4 
This thesis investigates the current state of driver’s licenses and identification 
cards through an examination of the Real ID Act of 2005 (RIA)5 and an analysis of 
enhanced driver licenses.  The RIA establishes minimum standards for driver’s licenses 
and identification cards and requires states to verify an applicant’s Social Security 
number, lawful immigration status and identity.6  Enhanced driver’s licenses were 
developed and implemented as a result of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
(WHTI).7  Enhanced driver’s licenses are an approved alternative travel document to a 
U.S. passport for reentry into the U.S. at land and sea borders with the U.S., Canada, 
Mexico and the Caribbean.8  
After five years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and states continue 
to struggle with implementation of the RIA.  The DHS Secretary, Janet Napolitano, has 
indicated that it is time to assess whether to repeal the RIA.9  State and federal officials 
have begun to reassess the RIA and evaluate new options for securing driver’s licenses 
and identification cards.  On July 15, 2009, the Senate Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs committee conducted a hearing to re-evaluate the RIA and debate 
                                                 
3 9/11 Commission, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report, Franklin: Providence Publishing 
Company, August 2004, 39–44. 
4 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Washington D.C.: http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf, 2004, 390. 
5 Division B—REAL ID Act of 2005, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (codified at 
49 U.S.C. 30301).   
6 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 35. 
7 Section 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec 17, 2004) is referred to as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). 
8 Department of Homeland Security, Enhanced Driver License: What are they? June 2009. 
http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/crossingborders/gc_1197575704846.shtm (accessed July 23, 2009). 
9 CNN Washington D.C. Office. Homeland Security Chief seeks to repeal REAL ID Act, April 22, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/22/real.ID.debate/ (accessed April 23, 2009).  
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the elements of new legislation sponsored by Democratic Senator Daniel Akaka from 
Hawaii entitled Providing Additional Security in States Identification (PASS ID).10  
Public debate is ongoing, and this thesis will add to the national discussion of the 
importance of securing driver’s licenses and identification cards for national security.   
B. PREVIEW OF ARGUMENT 
The implementation of the RIA impacts everyone in the United States who holds 
a driver’s license or identification card, requiring the re-issue of driver’s license and 
identification cards to all 245 million current identification card holders.11  But moving 
forward with implementation of the RIA, using the current DHS guidelines, may not be 
effective in addressing terrorism concerns.  The RIA requires states to use digital 
photographs on driver’s licenses and identification cards as the primary biometric for 
identification.  This may be a problem, however, because an individual’s physical 
appearance can change drastically because of weight loss, hair loss, weight gain, or a 
change in hair color, making it difficult for law enforcement or Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) officers to positively identify individuals.  Other biometric 
identification markers such as fingerprinting, iris scans, hand geometry and facial 
recognition may provide better capabilities for positive identification.  
In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and law enforcement 
agencies have been using both photographs and fingerprints as an indicator of identity for 
decades.  If the intent of standardizing driver’s license and identification cards is to 
improve national security, then incorporating the latest biometric technology in 
identification systems may help to secure the homeland.   
This thesis will examine how effective identification card technical solutions are 
in prohibiting terrorists and illegal immigrants from operating in the United States 
through a review of laws, technologies, issues and analysis of the arguments for and 
                                                 
10 Andrea Fuller, Effort to Replace Federal Driver’s License Mandate Gains, July 16, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/us/16identify.html (accessed July 16, 2009 ). 
11 Nikki Swartz, “REAL ID to Cost $11 Billion Plus,” Information Management Journal, Jan/Feb 
2007; 41, 1: 12.  
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against the RIA and other identification systems.  This thesis argues that the use of 
biometric technology in driver licenses and identification cards systems would be a more 
effective counterterrorism technique than if the government continues to move forward 
with implementing the current RIA requirements.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology in this research is primarily analytic.  The thesis includes an 
analysis of the arguments of the proponents and opponents of the RIA and national 
identification card standards.  It also makes a comparative analysis of biometric 
identification through a review of various states’ efforts for an Enhanced Driver’s 
License (EDL) and federal agency programs, including US-VISIT, which require the 
collection and utilization of biometric information for national security purposes.  
Analysis of technical, statistical, polling information and data will result in a proposed 
recommendation to accomplish assured personal identification through the use of driver’s 
licenses and identification cards. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into several chapters composed of background, technical, 
comparative analysis and recommendations.  Chapter II provides an overview of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, the background on RIA legislation, REAL ID compliant 
card requirements and characteristics and financial costs.  It also covers the opponent and 
proponent arguments regarding the RIA and the current status of the debate. 
Chapter III provides the technical background on identification systems and 
biometrics, and an analysis of current technologies including limitations and their 
accuracy.  The chapter explains how biometric technologies are used commercially and 
within the government, including Department of Defense (DoD) use of biometrics in Iraq 
and Afghanistan as a counterterrorism tool. 
Chapter IV analyzes alternative courses of action including the use of the EDL.  
Elements such as implementation feasibility, cost, privacy protection, projected 
5 
 
effectiveness and benefits are analyzed.  Chapter V gives a summary review and provides 
recommendations on how driver’s licenses and identification cards can be improved. 
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A. 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 
The 9/11 Commission outlined how weaknesses and loopholes in immigration 
policy, lack of standards in the issuance of state driver’s license and identification cards, 
and problems in border security enforcement allowed the 9/11 terrorists to easily travel 
to, from and within the United States prior to conducting the terrorist attacks.12  The 9/11 
Commission provided clear recommendations on the importance of resolving issues of 
personal identification within the United States:  
Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal 
government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and 
sources of identification, such as driver licenses. Fraud in identification 
documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to 
vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of 
identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they 
say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.13 
B. REAL ID ACT OF 2005 (RIA) 
The 9/11 Commission Report was followed by a number of legislative bills 
including: the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the 
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief (H.R. 1268), Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, and  Implementing 
the Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, all of which were intended to 
address some of the homeland defense and security problems identified by the 9/11 
Commission.14  In an effort to address the lack of standards with driver’s licenses and 
                                                 
12 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel, Franklin, TN: Providence Publishing Corporation, 2004, 43–46. 
13 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Washington D.C. : http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf, 2004, 390. 
14 Andorra Bruno, “Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 109th Congress,” CRS Report to 
Congress, Updated December 7, 2006, 1–3. 
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identification cards the executive and legislative branches passed the REAL ID Act of 
2005 (RIA).  The RIA was passed as a supplement bill to the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief (H.R. 
1268), and the way it became law is sometimes seen as more controversial than the 
legislation’s content.   
Even prior to the 9/11 Commission Report there was a growing consensus in 
Congress that something had to done to improve the identification system in the United 
States.  In May 2002, Representative James Moran, Democrat from Virginia, introduced 
the Driver’s License Modernization Act of 2002 (H.R. 4633).15  Although H.R. 4633 
never became law, it would have required each state: 1) to have a driver’s license and 
identification card that contained biometric data and other security features, 2) link state 
motor vehicle databases electronically with the federal government, and 3) implement 
nationally-standardized procedures for accurately documenting the identity and residence 
of an individual before issuing a license or card.16  Concerns over civil liberties, financial 
costs, states’ rights, and that the legislation was a back door approach to combating 
illegal immigration led to the bill’s defeat in Congress. 
In 2004, Wisconsin Representative James Sensenbrenner, Republican and chair of 
the House Judiciary Committee, introduced the RIA as part of Section 7212 of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.17  However, the RIA section 
of the legislation did not have support in the Senate.  After the Senate threatened to kill 
the entire bill, the RIA was removed, but with agreement from House of Representative 
leadership that the RIA would be included in the next piece of legislation that both 
chambers were expected to pass.18   
                                                 
15 , Anna Ya Ni and Alfred Tat-Kei Ho, “A Quiet Revolution or a Flashy Blip? The REAL ID Act and 
U.S. National Identification System Reform,” Public Administration Review, Nov/Dec 2008; 68, 6:1071. 
16 Ibid., 1070. 
17 Ibid., 1071. 
18 Mary Curtius, GOP Push for Immigration Curbs, January 27, 2005. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/27/nation/na-immig27 (accessed August 4, 2009).  
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On January 26, 2005, the RIA was re-introduced by Republican Representative 
James Sensenbrenner as H.R. 418; the bill was passed by the House, recommended to the 
Senate and subsequently reattached to a supplemental spending bill as H.R. 1268 without 
debate in the Senate.19  The RIA became law as part of Public Law 109-13, Division B 
(H.R. 1268), as a supplemental appropriations bill.20  The RIA included changes to 
asylum, outlined compliance requirements for state-issued licenses and identification 
cards, added limits on federal judicial review of removal of aliens, expanded exclusion 
and removal of terrorist suspects, and included funding to expedite the construction of 
border barriers and improve border infrastructure and technology integration.21  The RIA 
includes the following driver’s license and identification card compliance requirements: 
identity verification, document authentication, card security, security plans, one driver, 
one license, and federal official purpose requirement.22 
1. Legislation 
Under Public Law 109–13, Division B, the RIA is comprised of seven sections 
(Sections 201–207).  Section 201 outlines the key definitions for the legislation.  Section 
202 establishes the minimum document requirements and minimum driver’s license and 
identification card issuance standards for federal recognition.  Section 203 amends 18 
U.S.C. 1028(a) to establish a federal criminal penalty for persons who knowingly traffic 
in actual authentication features for use in fraudulent identification cards.23  Section 204 
                                                 
19 Martin W Ardis, Real ID Act of 2005 and its Interpretation (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Publishers, 
2005), 3. 
20 Department of Homeland Security, Public Law 109-13 109th Congress, April 10, 2009. 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ013.109 
(accessed July 10, 2009). 
21 Andorra Bruno, “Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 109th Congress,” CRS Report to 
Congress, Updated December 7, 2006, 1–4. 
22 Janice L. Kephart and Jena Baker McNeil, The PASS ID Act: Rolling Back Security Standards for 
Driver’s License, Background Report on REAL ID Act and PASS ID Act, Washington D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation, 2009, 3. 
23 Department of Homeland Security Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “Minimum Standards for 
Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable to Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,” DHS. 




authorizes the DHS Secretary to make grants to assist states with meeting the RIA 
standards and provides an authorization of appropriations for fiscal years 2005 through 
2009.24 
Section 205 grants authority to the DHS Secretary to issue regulations, set 
standards, and issue grants in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the 
states.25  Section 206 repeals Section 7212 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458).26  Section 7212, of Public Law 108–458, 
requires the federal government to establish a negotiated rule making committee of 
subject matter experts to propose workable driver’s license standards.27  Section 207, 
Limitation on Statutory Construction, limits the authority and specifies that nothing in the 
RIA affects the authorities or responsibilities of the Secretary of Transportation or the 
states under chapter 303 of title 49, United States Code.28 
2. DHS Regulatory Review and Final Rulemaking 
On March 9, 2007, DHS published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in 
the Federal Register requesting public comments on the RIA from states and citizens.29  
DHS received more than 21,000 comments to the NPRM; the comments are available for 
public view in the Federal Docket Management System at: http://www.regulations.gov.30  
                                                 
24 Department of Homeland Security, Public Law 109-13 109th Congress, April 10, 2009. 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ013.109 
(accessed July 10, 2009).  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Web Cast of July 15, 2009 
Identification Security: Reevaluating the REAL ID Act: (Senator Lieberman Opening Remarks, 26:05 
Minute Mark), July 15, 2009. 
28 Department of Homeland Security, Public Law 109-13 109th Congress, April 10, 2009. 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ013.109 
(accessed July 10, 2009). 
29 National Archives and Records Administration, “Department of Homeland Security: 6 CFR Part 37, 
Docket No. DHS-2006-0030, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards,” Federal 
Register, March 2007, 2007, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/07-1009.pdf (accessed July 21, 2009). 
30 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 26. 
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DHS responded to all comments relating to the Regulatory Evaluation and subsequently 
issued the DHS Final Rulemaking Regulatory Evaluation for the RIA on January 17, 
2008. 
In accordance with the final ruling, RIA licenses and non-driver identity cards 
issued by states will be acceptable for official purposes.  DHS refined and limited the 
definition of official purposes to those uses listed by Congress in the statute: boarding a 
federally-regulated commercial aircraft, accessing a federal facility, and entering nuclear 
power plants.31  The RIA is not mandatory and permits states to continue to issue driver’s 
licenses and identification cards that are not compliant with the RIA’s requirements.  
However, if states want their residents to be able to use their driver’s licenses to access 
federal facilities or get on a commercial airplane, the licenses must meet RIA 
requirements.  The RIA requires DHS to determine whether a state has met RIA 
requirements based upon certifications submitted by each state to DHS.  DHS must 
concur with compliance before a state-issued driver’s license or identification card may 
be accepted by federal agencies for official purposes.32 
The final rule sets four compliance dates related to the use of state driver’s 
licenses and identification cards for official purposes:  
1. May 11, 2008–federal government cannot accept state-issued driver 
licenses or identification cards for official purposes from states determined 
to be not in compliance unless an extension has been granted by DHS 
(DHS granted extensions to all 56 jurisdictions in 2008).33 
2. January 1, 2010–the initial extension will terminate unless states are 
granted a second extension and meet certain RIA benchmarks.  REAL ID 
                                                 
31Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 35–36. 
32 Department of Homeland Security Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Minimum Standards for 
Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable to Federal Agencies for Official Purposes," DHS. 
REAL ID Act of 2005, March 2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nprm_realid.pdf (accessed July 26, 
2009), 10. 
33 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID: States Granted Extensions, November 10, 2008. 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1204567770971.shtm#3 (accessed June 21, 2009). 
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cards from states granted a second extension and in material compliance 
with the rule will be accepted for official purposes (Reference Appendix: 
REAL ID Act Material Compliance Checklist for a complete listing of 
material compliance requirements).  
3. December 1, 2014–only REAL ID cards will be accepted from individuals 
born on or after December 1, 1964, for official purposes. 
4. December 1, 2017–Federal agencies will only accept REAL ID driver’s 
license or identification cards for official purposes.34 
3. Driver’s License and Identification Card Standards 
Section 202 of the RIA established the information and features that must appear 
on official driver’s licenses or identification cards.  REAL ID-compliant driver’s licenses 
and identification cards must include the following components on the front of the card: 
full legal name, date of birth, gender (as determined by the state), unique driver’s license 
or identification card number, address of principal residence, signature and a full facial 
digital photograph.35  Individuals unable to sign their names are authorized to use the 
Latin alphabet as an alternative to the signature.36  
Section 202 requires each person applying for a driver’s license or identification 
card to submit to a mandatory facial image capture.37  The digital photograph may be in 
black and white or color, and states must take the photograph at the beginning of the 
application process in order to deter applicants from presenting fraudulent documents, 
and “shopping” Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) offices after being denied by 
                                                 
34 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 36. 
35 Department of Homeland Security, “Final Rule: Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identifcation Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,” Federal Register, Volume 73, 
Number 19, January 28, 2008, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/08-140.htm (accessed July 1, 2009). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Department of Homeland Security Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “Minimum Standards for 
Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable to Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,” DHS. 




another DMV office in the same jurisdiction.38  Individuals denied a REAL ID card will 
have their photograph stored for a period of five years, regardless of the reason that the 
state denies the application.39  Digital photographs taken must comply with current 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 9303 standards.40 
Many states use a composite card stock material in driver’s licenses and 
identification cards, often Teslin with a laminate overlay, which is vulnerable to 
counterfeit with modern copiers, scanners and printing equipment.41  To prevent 
counterfeiting and altering of cards that use REAL ID’s to create fraudulent documents, 
Section 37.15 of the RIA final ruling establishes anti-counterfeiting benchmarks for states 
requiring at least three levels of integrated security features.42  The three levels of 
integrated security card features required for REAL IDs include: 1) Level 1–overt 
features visually or tactilely apparent by cursory examination without the use of aids, 2) 
Level 2–a feature detected by inspection through the use of basic tools or instruments, 
and 3) Level 3–covert feature detectable only through the use of forensic inspectors and 
the use of advanced tools and equipment.43  In 2008, DHS determined that it would be in 
the best interest of the nation’s security for states to place a security marking on the 
REAL ID-compliant driver’s licenses and identification cards to allow federal agencies to 
easily distinguish between REAL ID-compliant cards and non-compliant cards.44 
                                                 
38 Department of Homeland Security, “Final Rule: Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identifcation Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,” Federal Register, Volume 73, 
Number 19, January 28, 2008, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/08-140.htm (accessed July 1, 2009). 
39 Ibid. 
40 The relevant ICAO standard is ICAO 9303 Part 1 Vol. 2, specifically ISO/IEC 19794-5 - 
Information technology - Biometric data interchange formats - Part 5: Face image data, which is 
incorporated into ICAO 9303.   
41 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 30. 
42 Department of Homeland Security, “Final Rule: Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identifcation Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,” Federal Register, Volume 73, 
Number 19, January 28, 2008, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/08-140.htm (accessed July 1, 2009). 
43 Department of Homeland Security, “Final Rule: Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identifcation Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,” Federal Register, Volume 73, 




The RIA requires states to incorporate machine readable technology, including a 
2-dimensional (2-D) barcode on REAL ID driver’s licenses or identification cards using 
the PDF-417 standard.  PDF-417 is the endorsed standard by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO).45  The 2-D barcode must include ten pieces of 
information: 1) expiration date, 2) full legal name, 3) date of transaction, 4) date of birth, 
5) gender, 6) address, 7) unique driver’s license or identification card number, 8) card 
design revision date, indicating the most recent change or modification to the visible 
format of the driver’s license or identification card, 9) inventory control number of the 
physical document, and 10) state or territory of issuance.46 
4. Financial Costs 
Cost estimates to implement the requirements outlined in the RIA have ranged 
from $4 billion to in excess of $23 billion.  Initially, DHS estimated the cost of 
implementing the RIA to be $23.1 billion over ten years, of which $10 billion to $14 
billion would be funded by the states.47  On January 17, 2008, DHS revised the RIA cost 
estimates in the RIA Regulatory Evaluation Final Rulemaking, reducing the overall cost 
estimate to $9.9 billion over 11 years, of which $3.97 billion would be required from the 
states.48  The revised lower cost estimate is based on the DHS assumption that seventy-
five percent of the nation’s drivers will seek a REAL ID.49  The assumption is based on 
the DHS analysis that: 1) a number of states will not require that all residents seeking 
driver’s licenses and identification cards obtain a REAL ID, 2) 25 percent of the 
                                                 
45 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 44. 
46 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 45. 
47 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Impact of Implementation: A 
Review of the REAL ID Act and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: Costs and Privacy Concerns, 
April 29, 2008, 360. 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=c8bd6312-5714-4a1c-
8f25-eef90c611a44 (accessed July 10, 2009).   
48 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 9. 
49 Ibid., 2–3. 
15 
 
population already holds a valid passport, and a percentage of this population may not 
obtain a REAL ID, and 3) 20 percent of the population has never flown on a commercial 
airplane and 47 percent flies rarely; DHS assumes that only a percentage of this group 
will obtain a REAL ID.50 
DHS estimates the four largest cost areas include: 1) opportunity costs to 
applicants ($5.2 billion), 2) maintaining the necessary data and interconnectivity ($1.5 
billion), 3) customer service ($970 million), and 4) card production and issuance ($953 
million).51  Opportunity costs comprise the cost for individuals to obtain source 
documents, applications and visiting DMVs.  Data and interconnectivity costs are the 
costs to the states for data systems and information technology.  Customer service costs 
comprise the transaction costs to the state DMVs due to the increased number of 
customers acquiring REAL IDs.  The card production and issuance costs are the costs to 
upgrade state driver’s licenses and identification cards to meet the minimum REAL ID 
card standards. 
Table 1 includes a complete breakdown of estimated costs as provided by DHS.  
Table 1 estimates are based on 477.1 million card issuances over 11 years of the analysis, 
with the average cost to the states per issuance being $8.31.52  Individuals incur the 
largest share of the costs, with more than 58 percent of the costs associated with 





                                                 
50 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 2–3. 
51 Ibid., 10.  
52 Ibid., 8–10. 
53 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 8–10 
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Estimated Costs (11 years) $ million (2006 dollars) % Total  
Costs to States 3,965 39.9%
Customer Service 970 9.8%
Card Production 953 9.6%
Data Systems & Information Technology 1,529 15.4%
Security & Information Awareness 490 4.9%
Data Verification 8 0.1%
Certification Processes 16 0.2%
Costs to Individuals 5,792 58.3%
Opportunity Costs 5,215 52.5%
Application Preparation 
(125.8 million hours) 
3,327 33.5%
Obtain Birth Certificate  
(20.1 million hours) 
530 5.3%
Obtain Social Security Card  
(1.6 million hours) 
44 0.4%
DMV Visits (49.8 million hours) 1,315 13.2%
Expenditures: Obtain Birth Certificate 577 5.8%
Costs to Private Sector 9 0.1%
Costs to Federal Government 171 1.7%
Social Security card issuance 50 0.5%
Data Verification–SAVE 14 0.1%
Data Systems & Information Technology 82 0.8%
Certification & training 25 0.3%
Total Costs 9,939 100%
Table 1.   Estimated Marginal Economic Cost of RIA (From Final Ruling, 9) 
C. NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION CARD DEBATE 
For the purposes of this thesis, a national identification system is defined as a 
system where the federal government, in coordination with the states, has established 
compulsory requirements and standards for state-issued driver’s licenses and 
identification cards.  The cards themselves can be issued by the states.  Like many 
policies, the public debate between proponents and opponents of identification system 
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changes, the RIA, and national identification cards reflects tensions between certain core 
values: federal power versus state and local authority, equal protection versus state 
sovereignty, individual privacy versus law for governing the public, convenience versus 
privacy, and national security versus economy.54  Since the RIA became law, there have 
been many editorials in newspapers and magazines and postings on Internet blogs and 
citizen organization Web sites outlining the proponent and opponent arguments.  Some of 
the important questions debated include: 1) does the public support changes to 
identification systems? 2) what biometric data should be required on driver’s licenses and 
identification cards? 3) will changing identification systems improve national security? 
4) is there a cost benefit? 5) how will the changes be paid for? and 6) how does creating a 
national standard for driver’s licenses and identification cards affect individual privacy 
and civil liberties?  This section will examine public opinion on the RIA and national 
identification standards, and the proponent and opponent arguments.   
1. Public Opinion on National Identification Card Standards 
No matter what identification card standards and policies are implemented to 
address the terrorist threat, in order for government resources to be allocated and 
implementation to be successful, public support of the counterterrorism measure is 
important.  Polling data indicates public awareness of the terrorist threat and support for 
national identification cards as a counterterrorism measure.  According to several polls 
conducted by the Pew Research Center, the American public’s assessment of terrorists’ 
abilities to launch another major attack against the United States have remained relatively 
stable since 9/11: In 2002, 61 percent of the American public believed the ability of the 
terrorists to launch an attack was about the same or greater than the 9/11 attacks, and in 
February 2009, 61 percent agreed.55  
                                                 
54 Anna Ya Ni and Alfred Tat-Kei Ho, “A Quiet Revolution or a Flashy Blip? The REAL ID Act and 
U.S. National Identification System Reform,” Public Administration Review, Nov/Dec 2008; 68, 6: 1074.  
55 Pew Research Center, No Change in Views of Torture, Warrantless Wiretaps, February 2009 News 
Release–Latest Poll, Washingt D.C.: Peoples Press, 2009, 2–3. 
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Immediately after 9/11, 70 percent of the American public supported 
counterterrorism measures that would require citizens to carry a national identity card at 
all times and to show it to a police officer upon request.56  In 2004, 56 percent supported 
the idea, but the drop did not reflect any break along partisan or ideological lines.57  A 
poll conducted in 2006 revealed that 57 percent supported requiring a national 
identification card as a counterterrorism policy.58   
2. Proponent Arguments 
The driver’s license is the most common form of identification used in the United 
States today, accepted for everything from opening a bank account to boarding a plane to 
picking up movie tickets with a credit card.59  To proponents, securing an already widely 
used credential and making it more difficult for criminals and terrorists to acquire them 
makes sense.60  Proponents of the RIA argue that, 
The 9/11 hijackers obtained 30 different driver’s licenses and 
identification cards and used 364 aliases, [and] for an extra $8 per license 
REAL ID will give law enforcement and security officials a powerful 
advantage against falsified documents, and it will bring some peace of 
mind to citizens wanting to protect their identity from theft by a criminal 
or illegal alien.61  
This section examines the proponent arguments that the RIA and national identification 
card standards will improve security, are cost beneficial, and reduce counterfeiting and 
identity theft.   
                                                 
56 Pew Research Center, Evenly Divided and Increasingly Polarized, Political Landscape Poll, 
Washington D.C.: People Press, 2004, 73–74. 
57 Ibid., 73.  
58 Pew Research Center, News Release - Latest Poll, December 2006 Poll Data, Washington D.C. : 
Peoples Press, 2006, 9–10.  
59 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Impact of Implementation: A 
Review of the REAL ID Act and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative Testimony from Janice Kephert, 
Former Counsel 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2008. 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=c8bd6312-5714-4a1c-
8f25-eef90c611a44 (accessed April 10, 2009).    
60 Ibid. 
61 Matt Sundeen, “The REAL ID Rebellion ” State Legislatures, Mar 2008; 34, 3: 26. 
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a. Improved Security 
The primary benefit of the RIA and establishing national standards for 
driver’s licenses and identification cards, advocates argue, is to improve national security 
by reducing the vulnerability of federal buildings, aircraft and nuclear facilities to 
criminal or terrorist activity.62  The author of the RIA, Representative James 
Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin) stated, 
REAL ID is a necessary program for keeping America safe, it is the will 
of the Congress and also a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission . . . 
repealing this important recommendation and substituting it with a 
weaker, less safe program provides terrorists with too many avenues to 
attack.63   
Sensenbrenner continued, “Without being able to change their identity terrorists are 
easier to detect and their plans easier for law enforcement to thwart–making everyone 
safer.”64 
The proponents are not necessarily a homogenous group.  Some proponents of the 
RIA and national identification card standards argue that the RIA is a positive step 
forward in securing identification systems and improving national security, but the 
federal government should encourage the inclusion of additional biometric indicators in 
identification cards and use biometric technologies to provide a better defensive 
mechanism against terrorists.  United States Congressman Mark Souder, Republican 
leader of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global 
Counterterrorism, is a proponent of the RIA and national identification card standards, 
but argues that the federal government should encourage states to incorporate biometric 
indicators in REAL ID-compliant driver licenses.  Representative Souder states: 
                                                 
62 Department of Homeland Security, “Final Rule: Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identifcation Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,” Federal Register, Volume 73, 
Number 19, January 28, 2008, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/08-140.htm (accessed July 1, 2009). 
63 CNN Washington D.C. Office. Homeland Security Chief seeks to repeal REAL ID Act, April 22, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/22/real.ID.debate/ (accessed April 23, 2009). 
64 Charlie Sykes, Senenbrenner Smacks A Clueless Napalitano, April 22, 2009. 
http://www.620wtmj.com/shows/charliesykes/43478517.html (accessed May 10, 2009).  
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Fundamentally, our homeland security is tied to the integrity of everyone’s 
identification card.  We can improve intelligence-sharing among federal 
agencies, we can construct physical and electronic fences along the border, 
and we can scan incoming cargo at our ports—but if we can’t verify the 
identity of someone trying to enter the United States (or the identity of 
someone who is already here) then we render much of our defenses 
impotent.  I believe that Congress should consider legislation providing 
financial incentives or direct funding to states that include biometrics in 
their REAL ID Act-compliant driver licenses.  By putting to work 
everyone’s individual uniqueness, we can improve all of our security.65 
Proponents of the RIA note that the combination of implementing the 
requirements of the RIA and the use of enhanced biometric technologies are having a 
positive impact in helping to identify and prosecute criminals in some states.  Indiana is 
using enhanced biometric technology including facial recognition software to find 
identity thieves and criminals.  In November 2008, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles 
(BMV) activated facial recognition technology in all BMV license branches to compare 
new photographs with the 6 million photographs in the BMV photo database.  Using the 
facial recognition technology to examine the 6 million photos in the database, the Indiana 
BMV identifies on average six new cases of possible identity theft per day.  Indiana cites 
the capture and imprisonment of David Grice who held five fraudulent identities, and 
William Sherman Smith who had 149 different driver’s licenses issued using the same 
photo and different names as major successes for the program.66   
b. Cost Benefit of Preventing a Terrorist Attack 
The immediate economic impact of the 9/11 attacks on the United States is 
estimated at between $55.8 billion and $63.9 billion just from the physical destruction, 
seven-day shutdown of airline system and lost New York City gross city product in the 
                                                 
65 Mark Souder, Why we need ID’s with Biometric Indicators, January 10, 2008. 
http://souder.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsCenter.Articles&ContentRecord_id=69f68198-19b9-
b4b1-1237-e37db00e6ddd&Region_id=&Issue_id=67cc589f-7e9c-9af9-7359-9a4ae482194b (accessed 
July 3, 2009). 
66 Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Identity Thieves Caught By DMV, August 9, 2009. 
http://www.in.gov/bmv/5168.htm (accessed August 9, 2009). 
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three months after the 9/11 attacks.67  The economic impacts of another terrorist attack of 
the magnitude of 9/11 to the United States over two years are estimated at $374.7 
billion.68   
To assess the cost benefit of the RIA, DHS conducted an analysis based on 
several different methodologies including: 1) assessing the discounted cost of a single 
attack comparable to the 9/11 attacks taking place sometime over the next eleven years, 
2) RIA having an impact on the annual probability of the United States experiencing a 
9/11 type attack (involving air transportation) in the eleven years following the issuance 
of the rule, and 3) the impact if the RIA were to prevent an incident that was half the 
magnitude in terms of the direct short-term impact of the 9/11 attacks (50 percent of the 
$63.9 billion or $32 billion).69  
Results of the DHS analysis indicate: 1) based on the first methodology, if 
the RIA requirements lowered by 0.25% per year the annual probability of a terrorist 
attack that caused both immediate and longer run impacts of $374.7 billion, the 
quantified benefits would be positive, 2) using methodology number two, the effects of 
the RIA are difficult to quantify and, 3) under the third analysis, if the RIA requirements 
lowered the annual probability of a terrorist attack by 2.9 percent per year the quantified 
net cost benefits of the RIA regulation would be positive.70   
c. Counterfeiting and Identity Theft Prevention  
A goal of the RIA is to help curtail identity theft and counterfeiting of 
driver’s licenses and identification cards.  In the pre-9/11 environment people thought of 
teenagers using fake identification cards for buying beer or cigarettes or gaining access to 
                                                 
67 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, Report 
Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 134. 
68 Ibid., 133. 
69 Ibid., 149–150. 
70 Ibid., 150. 
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bars, but post 9/11 the implications are different.71  In the post-9/11 environment 
counterfeiting of driver’s licenses is not just about buying cigarettes and beer.  By 
obtaining counterfeit identification cards criminals and terrorists can open banking 
accounts, drive a vehicle, board commercial aircraft or acquire an apartment.  
Counterfeiting of non-REAL ID compliant cards is relatively easy and often big business 
for criminals.  According to Major David Myers, of the Florida Alcoholic Beverages and 
Tobacco Division, “It’s not unusual to bust a counterfeiter who has made over 10,000 
falsified documents.”72  REAL ID’s will incorporate at least three levels of security 
features in driver’s licenses and identification cards, making it more difficult and costly 
for criminals and terrorists to create counterfeit identification cards.   
DHS conducted an analysis of identity theft complaints reported by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2005.  Presentation of a driver’s license accounted 
for 28% of all reported incidents.73  The types of identity theft requiring presentation of a 
driver’s license included in the analysis are: medical fraud, evasion of legal sanctions, 
bank fraud (existing new accounts), employment fraud, house/apartment/rental property 
fraud and insurance fraud.74  DHS estimated that if the RIA reduced the successful 
commission of driver’s license related identity theft by 10 percent, a benefit of $0.6 
billion would be attained over five years.   
An analysis of the 2008 FTC data on identity theft and fraud indicates 
there may be even more savings than estimated in 2005 by implementing the RIA or 
equivalent identification card standards.  According to the FTC, from January through 
December 2008 identity theft (26%) and fraud (52%) comprised 78% of the 1.2 million 
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consumer complaints received.75  In 2008, medical fraud, evasion of legal sanctions, 
bank fraud (existing and new accounts), employment fraud, house/apartment/rental 
property fraud and insurance fraud together accounted for 31.4% of all reported incidents, 
which is a 3% increase over 2005.76  An estimate of the resource cost to households is 
not available from DHS for 2008, but applying the same estimate of a 10% benefit which 
was utilized by DHS in the initial analysis would result in a substantial savings to 
consumers equal to or higher than the DHS estimate based on 2005 FTC data.   
d. Ancillary Benefits 
There are several possible ancillary benefits to the RIA and establishing 
national identification card standards that are not necessarily quantifiable but include 
reducing: fraudulent access to public subsidies from government programs such as 
Medicaid, Medicare and in-state tuition rates by non-residence, the hiring of illegal 
immigrants, unlawful employment of convicted criminals, unlawful access to firearms, 
and voter fraud.77   
3. Opponent Arguments 
This section addresses the opponent arguments against the RIA and national 
identification card standards.  Key areas of concern include impact to civil liberties, 
vulnerability to criminal activity, funding, impact to state rights and the lack of debate by 
the Senate prior to being passed.  Some opponents of the RIA also argue that they do not 
necessarily oppose the concept of national identification card standards, but they have 
concerns over how the RIA was enacted and how DHS is implementing the legislation.   
                                                 
75 Federal Trade Commission, “Consumer Sentinel Data Book January - December 2008.” 
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a. Civil Liberty and Privacy Concerns 
There are concerns that implementing the RIA will infringe on individual 
privacy and security.  One question is: If the government stores driver’s license and 
identification card data in a central database or an integrated state database system, who 
will have access to the information and when could it be accessed?  Many privacy 
advocates are concerned about the collection and retention of data in large state databases 
will lead to an integrated national database on all 245 million driver’s license and 
identification card holders.78  The creation of a central repository would provide 
government agencies a valuable tool to conduct surveillance on citizens and legal 
residents or make large millions of individual personal records vulnerable to theft.79  
Anne Collins, the former Registrar of Motor Vehicles for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, said in testimony to the DHS Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory 
Committee, “If you build it they will come.”80  Jim Harper, Director of Information 
Policy Studies for the Cato Institute continued, “Massed personal information will be an 
irresistible attraction to DHS and many other governmental entities who will dip into data 
about us for an endless variety of purposes.”81  Large-scale data breaches have occurred 
in state DMVs across the country.  In 2005, the Oregon DMV lost a half million records, 
and as databases are linked under RIA, opponents worry the breaches will only grow in 
scale.82   
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) states that while the 
RIA creates a national identification system the federal government has punted the issue 
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U.S. National Identification System Reform,” Public Administration Review, Nov/Dec 2008; 68, 6, 1067. 
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of privacy protection to the states.83  EPIC continues, “The RIA does not include 
statutory language authorizing DHS to prescribe privacy requirements for the state 
controlled databases or data exchanges necessary to implement the RIA … [therefore] the 
Privacy Act of 1974 must be mandated in the RIA implementation regulations in order 
for DHS to fulfill its obligations.”84  
b. Identification Systems Vulnerable to Criminal Activity 
Critics charge that if states implement the RIA using the current 
requirements, potential terrorists would be able to exploit identification card system 
vulnerabilities when planning, traveling and conducting terrorist attacks within the 
United States just as Al Qaeda did for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Regardless of the 
improvements made to identification systems the systems are still vulnerable to criminal 
activity from a small minority of DMV employees and others with access to personal 
information contained in the databases.  Bruce Schneier, a prominent security 
technologist, argues,  
REAL ID will not prevent people from getting legitimate identification 
cards with fraudulent names . . . three of the 9/11 terrorists had valid 
Virginia driver’s licenses in fake names after bribing a DMV employee  
. . . any identification system involves people, fallible people who make 
regular mistakes.85   
In July 2009, the Los Angeles Police Department, FBI, and district 
attorney’s office tracked Shamsha Laiwalla, a Pakistan native in Los Angeles, and 13 
accomplices who allegedly paid DMV workers in several states to provide fraudulent 
documents including driver’s licenses.86  One of Laiwalla’s contacts altered DMV 
records for members of a criminal organization that dealt drugs and sold counterfeit 
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goods; the money from the criminal enterprise is suspected of helping to fund Hezbollah, 
a militant Shiite Muslim group.87  George Huber, commander of the California DMV’s 
internal affairs branch, acknowledges the challenge stating, “There is always going to be 
a criminal element outside that is going to be looking to exploit weaknesses in our system 
… our employees don’t get paid very much [and] the temptation is always there.”88 
c. Unfunded Mandate to States 
In 2008, the DHS cost estimate for the RIA was $9.9 billion over eleven 
years, but many governors and state representatives believe the DHS estimate is low.  In 
2006, the National Governors Association (NGA), National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators 
(AAMVA) conducted a nationwide survey of state motor vehicle agencies to understand 
the fiscal and operational impact of the RIA.  Based on the results of the survey the NGA, 
NCSL and AAMVA concluded that RIA will cost more than $11 billion over five 
years.89 
In describing the impact of the RIA on states the NGA described the RIA 
as unrealistic and “an unfunded mandate of $11 billion over five years that its members 
cannot afford.”90  Janet Napolitano, the current Secretary of DHS, while governor of 
Arizona, “signed [a bill], barring Arizona's compliance with the Real ID program, …, she 
called it an unfunded federal mandate that would stick states such as Arizona with a 
multibillion-dollar bill for the cost to develop and implement.”91   
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d. Federal Power vs. State and Local Authority  
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.92  State rights proponents 
argue that the RIA infringes upon states rights established by the Tenth Amendment, 
arguing that the RIA is another example that the balance of power between the states and 
the federal government is out of alignment.93   
Citizen opponents of the federal government imposing national 
identification standards on states are also actively engaged in the debate.  Michael 
Boldin, a 36-year-old Web marketer, founded the Web site TenthAmendmentCenter.com, 
which has grown to 20,000 viewers per day, after watching the Maine State Legislature 
fight DHS on the RIA.94  Boldin states, “Maine resisted, the government backed off, and 
soon all of these other states were doing the same thing.”95  Since 2007, 21 states have 
passed measures either prohibiting state compliance with the RIA or have urged Congress 
to amend or repeal the Act.96   
e. RIA Legislation Passed without Debate 
Not all opponents of the RIA are against the concept of implementing 
national standards for driver’s licenses and identification cards.  Some opponents of the 
RIA argue that the RIA was rushed through without adequate debate and there should be 
further national discussion on how best to address identification problems.  Because the 
RIA was moved through the legislative approval process quickly as part of a 
supplemental bill, real debate over national identification did not take place until after 
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RIA was signed into law.97  According to a public policy assessment of the RIA 
conducted by Anna Ya-Ni and Alfred Tat-Kei Ho, “Changes which have significant and 
long lasting effects should only occur through a democratic, accountable and transparent 
process . . . and there are serious doubts as to whether the RIA could have met this 
criterion.”98  
D. CURRENT STATUS 
This section will examine the current status of the RIA and recent developments 
pertaining to national identification card standards.  On July 15, 2009, the Senate 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee (Homeland Security Committee) 
conducted a hearing to re-evaluate the RIA and debate the elements of new legislation is 
entitled Providing Additional Security in States Identification (PASS ID) Act (S. 1261).99  
Senator Joseph Lieberman, Independent of Connecticut and chairman of the Homeland 
Security Committee, opened the hearings by stating; 
I regret to say that I’m not surprised we are here today, when Congress 
adopted the RIA as an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill—
without hearings of any kind or formal public vetting—we replaced a 
process for developing federal identification requirements that Senator 
Collins and I had made part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act 
of 2004, the so-called 9/11 Commission legislation.100 
Key members of the 9/11 Commission have also weighed in on the lack of 
progress which has been made since the 9/11 Commission Report was published.  In July 
2009, the bipartisan National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG) was formed, which is 
headed by 9/11 Commission co-chairs Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton.  NSPG gathered 
to pressure the government to act on the 9/11 Commission’s unfinished business 
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including the failure to enforce national standards for state driver licenses and 
identification cards.101  Thomas Kean stated, “I’m worried that 20 percent [of the 
recommendations] haven’t been addressed, [and] I’m worried that among the 80 percent 
things aren’t fully done.”102 
1. RIA 
Many states have made progress and are working towards meeting the 
requirements established by the RIA.  However, thirteen states have enacted laws 
prohibiting compliance with the RIA, and it is unlikely that the majority of states will 
meet the next milestone, which is the material compliance deadline.  In March 2009, the 
DHS Inspector General (IG) outlined several areas of concern with the implementation of 
the RIA.  The DHS IG reported that 95% of states stated that DHS grants are insufficient 
to mitigate RIA implementation, that DHS guidance to states is not being provided in a 
timely fashion, that 68% of states report that implementation is cost prohibitive, and that 
states may not meet the December 31, 2009, material compliance deadline.103   
On July 15, 2009, in testimony before the Homeland Security Committee, DHS 
Secretary Napolitano stated; “from the perspective of DHS, the major problem is that it is 
producing very little progress in terms of securing driver’s licenses …simply put, REAL 
ID is unrealistic.”104  Napolitano continued, “Today, this hefty burden is made even more 
onerous by the economic conditions that are constricting state budgets.”105  
Representative Sensenbrenner, the sponsor of the RIA, argues; “to date, states have 
received approximately $130 million from the federal government towards RIA 
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implementation, while additional funding will be needed to further implement the RIA, 
this program has a positive return on investment by eliminating waste and reducing 
fraud.”106  Although the debate continues over the RIA, because of lack of progress by 
states to complete the material compliance requirements, DHS and the legislative 
branches will have to determine whether to repeal the RIA or grant a second extension to 
allow states to meet the material compliance requirements outlined in the legislation. 
2. PASS ID Act 
There is legislative movement to replace the RIA with the PASS ID Act (S.1261).  
The components of the PASS ID Act were recently debated before the Senate Homeland 
Security Committee.  In testimony, DHS Secretary Napolitano stated, “All in all, PASS 
ID is the fix for REAL ID that the nation needs, one that keeps strong security standards 
that are critical to our safety, but provides workable ways to achieve those standards.”107  
Key differences between the RIA and initial PASS ID Act legislation include: RIA 
mandates electronic verification for validating the underlying the documents of a state 
issued driver’s license while PASS ID allows states options to make these 
determinations, DHS projects lower potential costs to states, PASS ID could be 
completed faster than the RIA; if Congress passed PASS ID in October 2009 the states 
could complete enrollment by July 2016, and PASS ID would not require states to 
provide direct access to each other’s driver’s license databases.108  In terms of the 
physical card characteristics, there have not been any major changes proposed which 
would change the requirements from those established in the RIA.  
During the Homeland Security Committee hearings, several Senators expressed 
concerns with allowing states flexibility in verifying citizenship and with how the PASS 
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ID Act might impact the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsibilities.  
Senator Lieberman requested additional discussions with DHS to resolve concerns prior 
to presenting the PASS ID Act for a committee vote.  The issues of concern were 
resolved within two weeks.  On July 29, 2009, the Senate Homeland Security Committee 
approved the PASS ID Act (S. 1261) by a unanimous vote after being amended to 
require: motor vehicle departments verify the authenticity of birth records prior to issuing 
driver’s licenses, and TSA retains its current authority.109   
Although the PASS ID Act legislation has passed through the Senate Homeland 
Security Committee there are still many unanswered questions pertaining to the impact to 
states, the financial costs and whether the PASS ID Act is an improvement over RIA.   
According to David Quan, the Director of Federal Relations for the National Governors 
Association, the implementation costs for PASS ID are estimated to be in the $2 billion 
range, although DHS and no states have conducted a comprehensive cost estimate.110  
Cost savings are projected to come from elimination of the RIA requirement for states to 
use electronic databases to verify U.S. passport information and savings from the 
development of new databases which would allow states to share driver’s license and 
identification card information with each other.  These databases do not exist or are not 
currently nationally deployed to DMVs.   
Opponents of PASS ID argue that PASS ID is a watered down version of the RIA 
and it will make the U.S. less safe.  Representative Sensenbrenner stated: “PASS ID is 
nothing but a smoke screen, allowing the Obama administration and DHS Secretary 
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Napolitano to turn back the clock to pre-9/11, while putting America at risk.”111  
Sensenbrenner continued, “Legislation must allow states to cross check an ID and 
mandate rigorous identity checks.”112  
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III. IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND USES 
A. BIOMETRICS  
Identification is the use of attributes to understand who a person is or refer to a 
person, and biometrics refers to measurable (anatomical or physiological) and behavioral 
characteristics such as fingerprint, facial or iris recognition, that can be used for 
automated recognition, and also verification or authentication of claimed identity.113  
“With the advent of biometrics, it is now possible to establish an identity based on who 
you are rather than by what you possess or what you remember.”114  Establishing that 
you are not someone—a negative claim to identity—can only be accomplished through 
biometrics.115  The following sections examine the basic characteristics of a biometric 
system including an analysis of how individuals enroll, how biometric systems are 
utilized, some of the commonly used performance metrics which are used to evaluate 
system accuracy and a comparison of the most commonly used biometric systems.   
1. Basic Biometric System 
A biometric system is a pattern recognition system that acquires biometric data 
from an individual, extracts a feature set from the data, compares this feature set against 
the feature set stored in a database, and executes an action based on the result of the 
comparison.116  Although there are many types of biometric systems, all biometric 
systems involve processes which can be divided into two stages: enrollment, and either 
verification or identification.117  A generic example of the components of a biometric 
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system can be viewed as a sensor module, a quality assessment and feature extraction 
module, a matching module and a database module.118   
a. Enrollment 
Biometric authentication involves the comparison of an enrolled biometric 
sample against a newly-captured biometric sample.  The enrollment process involves 
presenting a biometric for capture to the sensor module, processing the information by a 
computer and storing the information in a database for a comparison.  The quality 
assessment and feature extraction module assesses the sample, also referred to as the trial, 
collected by the sensor to determine if the sample is suitable for further processing.  If the 
sample is not of high enough quality then the individual will be required to present the 
biometric again.  Once the collected biometric feature set meets the biometric systems 
quality standard, the feature set is stored in a database.  The collected biometric feature 
set is referred to as the template.  The system database acts as the repository of the 
template along with other biographic information such as name, address and age which 
characterizes the identity of the individual.119 
b. Verification 
The biometric system can operate in either verification or identification 
mode.  In verification mode, the biometric system authenticates an individual’s claimed 
identity from their previously enrolled biometric template.  In the verification based 
system, the individual who desires to be recognized claims an identity, usually a name or 
user name, or holds a smart card which is entered into the biometric system prior to 
presenting a biometric sample.  Once the biometric sample is presented to the sensor, the 
biometric system conducts a one-to-one comparison against the biometric template to  
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determine whether the claim of identity is true or not.120  The objective of the verification 
process, referred to as one-to-one matching, is to prevent multiple people from using the 
same identity.121   
An example of a basic biometric system operating in verification mode is 
shown in Figure 1.  An individual who is enrolled in the biometric system will have their 
biometric template stored in a database.  During verification the individual will present 
their biometric which is captured, processed and then compared to the specific 
individual’s stored biometric template.  If the presented biometric sample matches the 
reference template, then the system will display a green light, otherwise a red light is 
displayed indicating a rejection of the individual.   
 
Figure 1.   Basic Biometric System in Verification Mode122 
c. Identification 
In identification mode, often described as one-to-many matching, instead 
of locating and comparing a person’s reference template against the presented biometric, 
the biometric system identifies a person from the entire enrolled population by searching 
a database for a match based solely on the biometric.123  Biometric systems operating in 
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identification mode are referred to as one-to-many because the individual’s biometric is 
compared against multiple templates in the system’s database.124   
There are two types of identification systems: positive identification 
systems, which are designed to ensure that an individual is enrolled in a database, and 
negative identification systems, which are designed to ensure an individual’s biometric 
information is not stored in a database.125  A typical use of positive identification systems 
is to secure a building or computer room by checking those who seek access against a 
database of authorized personnel.  A negative identification system might be utilized to 
prevent individuals from registering for federal or state benefit programs multiple times 
under multiple identities.   
2. Biometric Technologies 
The evolution of biometric system technology in recent years has moved the 
technology from rudimentary fingerprint and photograph biometric trait authentication to 
an expanded list of traits which can be used for identification.  Commercial companies 
and academic researchers have either developed or are researching biometric systems that 
utilize iris, face, fingerprint, palm print, brain wave, ear shape, hand geometry, knee, vein 
pattern, voice, gait, DNA and odor traits, among others.126  Research is being conducted 
to find methods to use quick X-ray snapshots of a person’s internal body parts, such as 
the knee, which would be more difficult for a criminal to spoof than an artificial 
fingerprint.127   
Each biometric system has unique characteristics, capabilities, issues and 
applications.  Of the more than a dozen biometric technologies, only a handful have been 
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tested by government agencies and shown to be ready for deployment on a large scale as 
would be required to support a national biometric identification program.  Several 
government reports have identified four biometric technologies as being most suitable for 
border and national security purposes.   
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) report on Military Critical 
Technologies identified six leading biometric technologies, of which the top four 
biometric systems identified as best suited for military and security applications are 
fingerprint analysis, facial recognition, hand geometry and iris recognition.128  The 
Congressional Research Report on Biometric Identifiers and Border Security identified 
the same four (fingerprint, facial recognition, hand geometry and iris recognition) leading 
biometric technologies, all of which are in wide use in North America, Europe, Asia and 
the Middle East.129   
Likewise, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) singled out these four 
for border security projects, stating that all are mature technologies and have been 
demonstrated effective in government pilot programs or operationally in border control 
operations.130  However, the GAO report does note that hand geometry may not be 
distinct enough to rapidly identify an individual from a large population.  The remainder 
of this section will examine the history, basic technical methods and current status of 
these four leading biometric technologies. 
a. Fingerprinting 
A fingerprint is the pattern of ridges and valleys on the surface of the 
fingertip.131  Fingerprints are the oldest and most widely-used biometric markers and 
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have been used for personal marks or signatures in parts of Asia as early as the third 
Century B.C.132  Since the late 1800s, fingerprints have been collected using ink and 
paper in Western societies.133  Fingerprints were one of the first biometric attributes to be 
used by law enforcement and government agencies for identification.  In 1903, the New 
York Bureau of Prisons established a Fingerprint Bureau to link criminals and their 
arrests.134  During World War II, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established a 
fingerprint applicant clearance check system to vet millions of military personnel and 
defense factory workers.135  Today, the most widely-used and best-known biometric 
identification system for law enforcement agencies is the FBI’s Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) which contains about 57 million fingerprint 
sets on file.136   
In the U.S., fingerprints have been used for decades to match individuals 
and are generally viewed as an acceptable method of identification.  A 1990 study of 
biometrics found that public acceptance of fingerprinting was 96%.137  Fingerprints are 
distinctive, but at the very end of an appendage that could be damaged by cleaning agents 
or physical injury.  Estimates are that 1% to 4% of fingerprints will not register in 
automated biometric applications.138  Research into 3-dimensional fingerprinting is 
ongoing at the University of Kentucky which, if successful, will reduce failure to enroll 
rates and make it easier to obtain accurate, detailed prints.139 
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Fingerprint systems use a comparison of a sample fingerprint to a person’s 
enrolled template in a database to authenticate an identity.  Depending on the technology 
utilized by the vendor, the size of fingerprint templates range from 250 bytes to 1,000 
bytes.140  The accuracy standard for commercial use of fingerprint biometric systems is 
no more than one error for every 1,000 scans.141  Government agencies face the challenge 
of making one-to-many fingerprint comparisons and getting the forensic quality prints 
needed for that.142  The collection of multiple fingerprints from a person provides 
additional information to facilitate large scale identification systems with millions of 
records.143   
Searching databases the size of the FBI’s IAFIS to match a single set of 
fingerprints against millions of stored fingerprint templates could be an extremely time 
consuming process.  To reduce the amount of time required to compare trial fingerprints 
against template fingerprints stored in large databases, a process called binning is often 
used.  The trial fingerprints are compared to a reference template in the large database 
and categorized according to the fingerprint type.144  Figure 2 shows three fingerprint bin 
categories which can be used to compare trial fingerprints against template fingerprints: 
plain arch (left), loop (middle) and plain whirl (right).145  By searching for matches 
within a specific bin the biometric system can quickly eliminate the bulk of non-matches 
first by looking at fingerprints which are similar. 
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Figure 2.   Binning Fingerprint Types (plain arch, loop and whirl)146 
Advantages to using fingerprint biometric systems include: individuals 
have multiple fingers to print; systems are easy to use; there is a large amount of existing 
data to allow background and watch list checks, technology has proven effective in many 
large systems over years of use; fingerprints are unique to each finger of each individual; 
and the ridge arrangement remains permanent during one’s lifetime.147  Disadvantages to 
using fingerprint biometric systems include: privacy concerns; health and societal 
concerns with touching a sensor used by countless individuals; and an individual’s age 
and occupation may cause some sensors difficulty in capturing a complete and accurate 
fingerprint image.148 
b. Hand Geometry 
Hand geometry recognition systems are based on a number of dimensional 
measurements taken from the human hand, including its shape, palm size, and the lengths 
and widths of the fingers.149  They are the second most widely-used biometric system, 
although no recorded uses of hand tracings were used to differentiate people prior to the 
introduction of hand geometry readers in the 1980s by Recognition Systems, Inc. (RSI) 
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of California.150  Today, RSI is a division of Ingersoll-Rand Inc. and sells approximately 
90% of hand geometry biometric products sold.151   
Hand geometry systems utilize a camera to capture an image of the hand.  
The camera captures the top surface of the hand and a side image (using a side mirror), 
resulting in a total of 90 or more measurements being taken.152  A mathematical 
algorithm is used to determine the unique aspects of the hand and converts the 90 
measurements into a 9-byte template, which is the smallest template required of any of 
the current biometric technologies.153  Current uses of hand geometry biometric systems 
include: access control and time and attendance, where hand geometry scanners are used 
to verify the identity of people punching in and out of work each day.154   
Hand geometry is one of the easiest methods to use.  However, while 
hands are robust, a person’s hand geometry can change from a major injury or suffer loss 
of dexterity or swelling from arthritis.  Advantages to using hand geometry include: small 
template size, easy to capture and patterns are highly stable over the adult lifespan.155  
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people have hands similar to your hand.”156  Disadvantages include: system use requires 
training and hand geometry may not be sufficiently distinctive for identification if there is 
a need to search large databases.157 
c. Iris Recognition 
In 1987, Ophthalmologists Leonard Florn and Arin Safir were awarded a 
patent for describing methods and apparatus for iris recognition based on visible iris 
features.158  Doctor Florn subsequently approached Dr. John Daugman of Cambridge 
University to investigate methods for automating identification of the iris.  Dr. Daugman 
developed algorithms, mathematical methods and techniques to encode iris patterns and 
compare them.159  In 1994, Dr. Daugman was awarded a patent, which expires in 2011, 
for his automated iris recognition systems called IrisCodes.160  All commercial 
applications currently implement IrisCodes, and Iridian Technologies, Inc. is the sole 
owner and developer of iris recognition technology, although hardware products are 
manufactured by a variety of corporations.161   
The characteristics of the iris are formed during the eighth month of 
gestation and will not change except through procedures such as cataract surgery, 
refractive surgery or cornea transplants.162  Figure 3 shows the iris location in relation to 
other parts of the human eye.  The iris has numerous forms of variability, and where other 
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biometrics have only 13 to 60 distinct characteristics, the iris has 266 unique spots that 
can be used for identification.163  Iris patterns differ from person to person, and it has 
been postulated that the probability of two individuals having the same iris pattern is 1 in 
7 billion.164  
 
Figure 3.   The Iris and Other Parts of the Eye165 
Iris recognition systems use cameras and infrared illumination to capture 
an image of the iris’s structure.  Images are then converted into digital templates which 
are used to create the IrisCode representations of the iris.  The IrisCode is typically a 256-
byte representation, although with additional header information it can be as large as 512 
bytes.166  The comparison of a trial IrisCode is conducted by determining the number of 
mismatched bytes between the trial IrisCode and the IrisCode templates in a biometric 
system database.  The extent to which the IrisCodes of the trial and the templates differ is 
referred to the Hamming Distance (HD).167  The key concept to iris recognition is the test 
of statistical independence.  If less than one-third of the bytes in the IrisCodes are 
different, then the IrisCode fails the test of statistical independence, indicating that the 
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IrisCodes are from the same iris.168  Researchers have calculated the odds of two 
different iris’s generating an IrisCode that produces a false match to be 1 in 1.2 
million.169   
Advantages to using iris recognition technology include: there is no 
physical contact required with sensor equipment, the iris is a protected internal organ 
which is less prone to injury and the iris characteristics are highly stable over lifetime.170  
Disadvantages include: the characteristics of the iris cannot be verified by a human, there 
are concerns with scanning of the eye with a light source, the systems require more 
training and attentiveness than most biometric systems and there is a lack of existing 
data, which limits the ability to conduct background or watch list checks.171  
d. Facial Recognition 
Facial recognition systems identify individuals through analysis of the 
unique patterns and contours on an individual’s face through thermal imaging, video or 
still images.  The first semi-automated facial recognition system was developed in the 
1960s, and required the administrator to locate the position of facial features on 
photographs before calculating distance and ratios to a common reference point.172  By 
1988, Michael Kirby and Lawrence Sirovich applied a new concept, incorporating a 
standard linear algebra technique to face recognition analysis called the eigenfaces 
technique; the result is somewhat of a milestone, as it showed that fewer than 100 values 
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were required to accurately code a facial image.173  In 1991, Matthew Turk and Alex 
Pentland utilized the eigenfaces technique to establish that residual error could be used to 
detect faces in images, a discovery that enabled reliable real-time automated face-
recognition systems.174  Today, facial recognition systems are used to allow access to 
military buildings, for surveillance and monitoring of people in crowds and stadiums, to 
combat passport fraud and identity fraud, and to support law enforcement. 
The two predominant approaches to face recognition include geometric 
(feature based) and photometric (appearance based).175  Geometric-based systems use 
areas, distances, and angles between facial feature points as descriptors for facial 
recognition.176  Appearance-based methods consider the global properties of a face image 
intensity pattern where face recognition algorithms compute basis vectors to represent 
face data.177  Depending on the specific technology, the template size of facial 
recognition samples ranges from 84 bytes to 1300 bytes.178    
Advantages to using facial recognition systems include: there is no contact 
with the sensor required, the camera sensors are readily available, large amounts of data 
exist to facilitate background and watch list checks and the systems are easy for humans 
to verify results.179  Disadvantages to using facial recognition include: the face can be 
obstructed by hair, glasses or a hat; the systems are sensitive to changes in lighting; faces 
change over time; and there is propensity for users to provide poor quality video or 
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pictures and expect accurate results from the recognition systems. 180  Also, facial 
recognition systems have one of the higher error rates, and it is debatable as to the utility 
and effectiveness to identify individuals, especially within large crowds such as at a 
stadium event.  An individual’s loss of weight, weight gain, plastic surgery or other 
changes in physical appearance could affect the effectiveness of facial recognition 
systems.   
3. Comparison of Biometric Technologies 
Specific biometric technologies may be more appropriate for different 
applications and the different biometric systems should be assessed based on the 
requirements.  For government organizations, selecting a specific biometric technology 
involves following the acquisition guidelines outlined in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, meeting developmental and operational testing requirements and staying 
within federal budget constraints.  As for commercial applications, the evolution of 
biometric systems now provides consumers with numerous options to improve security 
and resolve identity matching.  This section will examine the performance characteristics 
that are used to assess the accuracy of biometric systems and the technology trade-offs, 
which both government and commercial organizations must weigh when evaluating 
whether biometric systems are appropriate for an organization’s requirements.   
a. Performance Characteristics 
The accuracy of a biometric system describes how well a system will 
perform, and is a key factor in public acceptance of biometric technology use by 
government organizations.  Biometrics is a science, but biometric systems have false 
positives and false negatives: they are not 100 percent accurate.181  How can the 
performances of different biometric systems be compared?  There are dozens of 
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performance statistics that could be used to measure the performance of a biometric 
system, but four of the most commonly used are failure to enroll, false rejection, false 
acceptance and the Crossover Error Rate (CER) or Equal Error Rate (EER).182   
Failure to enroll (FTE) occurs when a biometric trial, submitted during the 
enrollment process, does not have enough identification points to identify the individual.  
The FTE problem is often the result of the sensor not capturing the information correctly, 
the captured sensor data being not of sufficient quality to develop a template or 
individuals not being properly trained to provide their biometrics.183  A low FTE is 
desirable.  If a biometric system is tested and found to have a 2 percent FTE, it does not 
necessarily mean that 2 percent of the time each enrolled user will experience a problem; 
it is likely that 2 percent of the enrolled population will experience problems 100 percent 
of the time.   
False Rejection Rate (FRR) is the rate at which an authorized user is 
incorrectly denied acceptance; the FRR is also referred to as the Type I error and the 
False Non-match Rate.184  An example of a false rejection is if William presents himself 
to the biometric system as William and the biometric system incorrectly rejects the claim.  
FRR errors are represented as the percentage of times the biometric system produces a 
false rejection.  If 1 in 10,000 authentication attempts results in the rejection of a 
legitimate user, then the FRR will equal 0.01 percent.   
The False Acceptance Rate (FAR) is the rate at which unauthorized users 
are incorrectly accepted as valid; the FAR is also referred to as the Type II error and the 
False Match Rate (FMR).185  An example of false acceptance is if Michael claims to be 
William and the biometric system incorrectly verifies the claim.  FAR errors are 
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represented as the percentage of times a biometric system produces a false accept.  If 1 in 
1,000 authentication attempts results in the acceptance of an illegitimate user, then the 
FAR is equal to 0.1 percent.  
In biometric systems, there is a trade-off between the FRR and the FAR, 
as the FAR increases the FRR decreases, and vice versa.  All biometric systems allow the 
administrator to adjust the sensitivity thresholds of the FAR and FRR to meet the 
organizations requirements.  An example of the considerations in a national security 
setting is that it is more important to have a 1 percent rejection rate of individuals (FRR) 
who should be accepted versus a 1 percent acceptance rate (FAR) of individuals who 
should not be accepted and who could be potential terrorists.  It might be an 
inconvenience for someone, who should have access, to be stopped by a security guard or 
a border agent, but allowing someone entry who should not have access could result in 
criminal acts or a potential terrorist attack.   
The Crossover Error Rate (CER) or Equal Error Rate (EER) is a statistic 
used to characterize biometric system performance in terms of both the FRR and FAR.186  
CER is a good indicator of the overall accuracy of a biometric system and facilitates the 
analysis and comparison of biometric products from different companies.  It represents 
the point at which the FRR equals the FAR on a receiver operating characteristic curve.  
The smaller the CER, the more accurate the system.  As an example of the significance of 
the CER, a biometric device with a crossover error rate of 1 percent is better than a 
device with 2 percent.  The CER rate provides an understanding of a biometric device’s 
overall accuracy for product comparison, but individual environments have specific 
security requirements, which dictate how many false rejection or false acceptance errors 
are acceptable.187 
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b. Technology Trade-offs 
Once an understanding of the technical and performance characteristics is 
obtained, the next step in determining which biometric technology is best suited for a 
particular environment and purpose is to conduct a trade-off analysis of biometric system 
characteristics.  Key factors, important to both federal agencies and commercial 
companies, include the performance characteristics, FTE, technology costs, ease of use, 
accuracy, user acceptance, required security level, error incidence and long term stability.   
What characteristics are most important?  If the technology is being used 
to secure a nuclear facility or classified military facility, then low error rates (especially 
FAR) and performance characteristics may be more important than other factors.  Most 
iris recognition systems have false acceptance rates under 1 percent.188  Low error rates 
make iris recognition systems ideal for protecting nuclear facilities and classified military 
facilities.  If a large commercial construction company is looking for a sturdy system to 
verify identity for employee onsite attendance, then a hand geometry system may best 
meet the requirements.  The most important factors in determining whether a biometric 
system is appropriate for an identified need will vary from organization to organization.  
Table 2 shows a sample comparison chart of biometric technologies 
against quantifiable measures, including: user acceptance, technology costs, factors 
affecting performance, performance characteristics, variability in the ability to identify 
individuals over time as they age, time to enroll and the time it takes for a system to 
process each user.189  Table 2 illustrates a basic comparison of the costs and benefits of 
fingerprint, iris, facial and hand geometry, although a more comprehensive analysis of 
factors would be required by most consumers or government agencies before investing in 
a specific vendor’s biometric system.  Large government agencies and commercial 
companies may require extensive operational testing of several different biometric system 
products prior to procuring large numbers of biometric systems.   
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Characteristic Fingerprint Iris Facial Hand 
Cost Low High Moderate Moderate 
Enrollment time 
estimate 
3 minutes, 30 
seconds 
2 minutes, 15 
seconds 
3 minutes 1 minute 
Transaction time 
estimate 
5 to 19 seconds 12 seconds 10 seconds 6 to 10 seconds 
False Rejection 
Rate (FRR) 
0.2% - 36% 1.9% - 6% 3.3% - 70% 0% - 5% 
False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR) 


























Stable Stable Affected by 
aging 
Stable 
Table 2.   Comparison of Biometric Systems (From Homeland Security Biometrics)190 
B. BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY USES 
This section will examine federal guidance on biometrics and how biometric 
technologies are used commercially as a replacement to identification cards and within 
the federal government as a law enforcement and counterterrorism tool.  
1. Federal Government 
There are four government communities collecting and using biometric data: 
homeland security, military, intelligence and law enforcement.  Who within the federal 
government has the responsibility for establishing biometric system standards for all 
federal agencies?  The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has a 
close partnership with U.S. government agencies and U.S. industry to help establish 
formal national and international biometric standards development bodies to accelerate 
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the development of biometric standards.191  But, with the national security implications 
and the enormous federal expenditures on biometric technology, the federal government 
required a more coordinated approach to ensure interoperability of federally funded 
biometric systems.   
On June 8, 2008, President George Bush signed National Security Presidential 
Directive–59 (NSPD-59)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive–24 (HSPD-24) 
entitled Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security.192  
NSPD-59/HSPD-24: 
 . . . establishes the framework to ensure federal departments and agencies 
use mutually-compatible methods and procedures for collection, storage, 
use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and biographic information while 
respecting information privacy and other legal rights under United States 
law.193  
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology, through the National Science and 
Technology Council, has been designated as the lead agency for coordinating biometric 
standards, research, testing and conformance testing for the federal government.194  
NSPD-59/HSPD-24 forced government agencies to begin a cooperative relationship and 
address issues as basic as establishing definitions and categories for biometric collection 
and establishing a collaborative environment amongst federal agencies.  The following 
sections examine the use of biometrics by the federal government for criminal 
investigation, border security and national defense.   
a. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
In the mid-1990s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established 
the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) to manage the 
                                                 
191 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National and International Biometric 
Standards - Development Bodies and Published Standards, February 2009, 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div893/biometrics/standards.html (accessed April 21, 2009). 
192 George W. Bush, Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security/NSPD-





millions of fingerprint sets on file.195  The IAFIS contains 57 million fingerprints sets on 
file, each set containing prints from all ten fingers.196  Despite the large number of 
fingerprint sets on file, six of seven U.S. citizens have never been fingerprinted and more 
than half of the fingerprints collected are not from criminals, but from law-abiding 
citizens who have submitted to background checks for employment purposes.197  Since 
9/11, the number of fingerprint searches has increased exponentially; the FBI now checks 
the identities of approximately 15,000 visa applicants for the U.S. State Department 
daily; and the IAFIS set a record in 2008 with 147,000 total identification checks in a 
single day.198  
The FBI is expected to spend up to $1 billion in the next ten years to 
enhance identification systems.199  In 2008, a contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin 
to develop the Next Generation Identification System (NGIS) for a multimodal 
biometrics system that will enable the collection and storage of additional biometric data 
from criminals and terrorists.200  The FBI is considering using palm prints, iris prints and 
facial scanning; palm prints may offer the most important improvement for law 
enforcement, because approximately 20 percent of latent prints gathered at crime scenes 
are from the palms of criminals.201  Objectives of NGIS include establishing 
interoperability with systems operated by DoD, DHS, the intelligence community and 
eventually the international community, keeping in mind that the system needs to take 
into account the privacy of individuals, meet data sharing laws and provide security.202   
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The FBI is also collecting biometric data in the global war on terrorism.  
According to the agency, officials who are using fingerprint biometrics technology in 
Afghanistan to identify individuals on the battlefield have found that the use of 
biometrics “does bear fruit.”203  Since 9/11, there have been many successes where 
biometric technology has been used on the battlefield to identify terrorists with ties to the 
United States.  A man stopped at a checkpoint in Tikrit, Iraq claimed to be a dirt poor 
farmer, but after a biometric fingerprint check with the FBI’s biometric criminal records, 
it turned out the man had 11 felony charges in the U.S., including assault with a deadly 
weapon.204  According to one report, in 2004, an FBI team helicoptered to a remote 
desert camp on the Iraq–Iran border, home to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK); the FBI 
team fingerprinted 3,800 fighters, and determined that more than 40 had previous 
criminal records in the agency's database.205 
b. Department of Defense 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has been at the forefront in 
implementing biometrics to secure overseas bases and for forensic purposes in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  According to Paul McHale, the Director of the DoD Biometrics Task Force 
(BTF): 
Our enemy today is no longer in uniform; our enemy today is probably 
wearing civilian clothes and is virtually indistinguishable from the 
innocent . . . biometric identification is an important way to distinguish 
friend from foe.”206  
The U.S. Army has been established as the executive agent for the DoD BTF.  
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Many of the current biometric capabilities being developed by DoD are to 
assist U.S. troops with identifying potential terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 2003 
and 2004, U.S. troops lacked the necessary capabilities to identify individuals passing 
through checkpoints and entering U.S. bases to perform day labor, making personnel 
vulnerable to terrorist attack.  In 2005, the U.S. Army awarded a $20 million contract to 
Northrop Grumman Corporation to develop a biometric solution to resolve issues relating 
to the identification of individuals.207   
The primary biometric identification capability that resulted from the 
contract is the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS).208   The ABIS is 
being used in a variety of ways, such as storing of forensic evidence from crime scenes, 
including fingerprints taken from improvised explosive devices, and sniper attack 
locations.  The ABIS biometric system registers people by their fingerprints, iris patterns 
and other biological metrics.  After the information is collected, the data is relayed back 
to the U.S. where the data is used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
identify individuals and search for connections between individuals.  Military members 
register individuals within the community and at check points and base access points 
using portable biometric scanners.  The collection of biometric data has been extensive.  
According to Colonel Eloy Campos: 
During my tenure in Iraq we collected in excess of 250,000 biometric 
scans on the local populace … this data led to the issue of resident 
identification cards … [and] on multiple occasions the resulting biometrics 
led our forces to insurgents and centers of activity.209 
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The ABIS contains around 3 million records and utilizes multimodal 
biometrics.210  Multimodal biometrics uses more than one technology to secure an 
identification match. If there is only a partial set of fingerprints and a photo of poor 
quality, the data can be used in context with other information, which may result in a 
positive match.  According to Lisa Swan, deputy director for the DoD Biometrics Task 
Force, “You get a score on the fingerprint that’s not high and the face that’s not high, but 
fused together it will provide a potential match.”211  The DoD is working with the FBI to 
make DoD ABIS and the FBI’s Next Generation Identification System (NGIS) 
interoperable.  
Within the DoD, biometrics technology is not just limited to data 
collection and analysis on the battlefield.  Many DoD organizations within the 
continental U.S. and at overseas bases are using biometrics systems to address base 
security issues.  The U.S. Air Force (USAF) Air Education and Training Command 
(AETC) implemented biometric identification systems at all base entry points.  Gate 
guards at Air Force bases are using handheld scanners to implement the Defense 
Biometric Identification System (DBIS).  The scanner reads the bar codes on DoD 
Common Access Cards and can tell instantly whether a person is allowed on the base or 
not.212  The biometric and biographical data attributes stored in DBIS include: name, age, 
height, photograph, fingerprints, address, telephone number, e-mail address, birthplace, 
nationality, education level and group affiliation. The DBIS database is connected with 
the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) that provides data on 
active-duty members, civilians, retired members and dependents.213  During periods of 
higher force protection, additional information can be added to the DBIS locally.214   
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In Southwest Asia, the 379th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron 
(ESFS) is using DBIS to process more than 1,600 third-country nationals (TCNs) daily 
who work on an overseas military base.215  The TCNs perform a wide range of support 
functions on many overseas military installations, including: food service, transportation, 
laundry and construction.  The data collection begins when an individual is hired by a 
unit or organization, and once data is collected, the individual must be cleared through 
DBIS.  The data collected is sent through the DoD Biometrics Fusion Center (BFC), 
located in West Virginia, which maintains an archive of DBIDS data from military 
installations worldwide.  After that, the data is run against several law enforcement 
databases, including the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists list.216  If the TCN receives 
approval from the BFC, then the individual will be processed for a TCN badge.  The 
TCN’s are required to scan in when entering and existing the installation each day.  
According to Airman Ramirez, currently deployed with the 379th ESFS, “knowing who is 
on the installation at all times and having a biometric system that tracks TCN’s allows for 
increased protection of every service member and is an asset on base.”217 
Discussion is ongoing within DoD on what biometrics might be 
incorporated in the Common Access Card (CAC) in the future.  The CAC is issued to 
military members, civilian employees and contractors, and enables access to military 
installations, receipt of benefits and access to DoD computer systems.  According to Lisa 
Swan, deputy director for the DoD Biometrics Task Force, “Using biometrics with the 
CAC is in the future plans…for more secure applications you will see biometrics fairly 
soon, it’s just a matter of what’s practical and what you’re trying to safeguard.”218  Swan 
continued, “the CAC will eventually be used with the biometric to access different 
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computer records [including health records] . . . our soldiers are more mobile now and 
this is something that could tie them to their records.”219  
c. Department of Homeland Security 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) United States Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program is the U.S. entry-exit 
program for foreign travelers and provides biometric technology to visa-issuing ports of 
entry.  The goals of the US-VISIT include: enhance the security of U.S. citizens and 
visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration 
system and protect the privacy of visitors.220  The process begins at a U.S. issuing post 
where a traveler’s biometrics—10 digital fingerprints and a photograph—are collected 
and checked against watch lists for known criminals and terrorists.  Later, when a traveler 
arrives in the U.S., the same biometrics are collected to verify identity at the port of 
entry.221  Currently, US-VISIT entry capabilities are operating at over 300 land, sea and 
air ports.222  Exit capabilities are not yet operating but, pilot efforts are underway.   
Robert Mocny, US-VISIT Director for DHS, stated “when we did the 
pilots [for exist procedures] between 2004 and 2007, we determined quickly that the 
[biometric] technology worked . . . what didn’t work was the process . . . you usually 
don’t check out of the U.S., so the exit process is really new to people.”223  In June 2009, 
DHS conducted an exit-tracking pilot program at Hartsfield International Airport in 
Atlanta, GA, during which Transportation Security Administration personnel with 
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handheld computers collected fingerprints, passport and visa data.224  Based on the 
results of the pilot program, the DHS will determine the best approach for collecting 
biometric information.  By March of 2010, a final rule for exit procedures at all airports 
and seaports will be issued.225  
The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency has 
received $1.6 billion from Congress to implement the Secure Communities program, 
which is chartered to identify and remove criminal aliens from the U.S.226  Secure 
Communities distributes both the FBI’s IAFIS biometrics-based criminal records, and the 
DHS’s biometric-based immigration history about inmates, and streamlines the process 
under which an arrested individual can be identified as a removable criminal alien.  The 
Secure Communities program is currently available to law enforcement agencies in 50 
counties nationwide, and will eventually be made available to all state and local law 
enforcement agencies throughout the nation.227   
Both local law enforcement agencies and federal officials believe the 
program will be very successful in helping to remove criminals and individuals identified 
on terrorist watch lists.  According to Sheriff Amadeo Ortiz, from Bexar County Texas, 
“This is a win-win situation for the community and law enforcement . . .  we are able to 
identify illegal immigrants who commit crimes . . . and get them in the process for 
deportation, and it does not require additional funds or manpower for us.”228  Robert 
Mocny, US-VISIT Director, stated “by enhancing the interoperability of DHS’s and the 
FBI’s biometric systems, we are able to give federal, state and local decision makers 
                                                 
224 Jill Aitoro, DHS Launches Second Test of Biometric Exit Processes, June 10, 2009. 
http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20090610_9479.php (accessed June 11, 2009). 
225 Ibid. 
226 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE: Secure Communities Program , May 
14, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/secure_communities.htm (accessed May 21, 2009). 
227 Imperial Valley News - Yuma, AZ, Program Broadened to Enhance Identification and Removal of 
Criminal Aliens, June 16, 2009. 
http://www.imperialvalleynews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5910&Itemid=1 




information that helps them better protect our communities and our nation.”229  The 
Secure Communities program has enormous potential.  In fiscal year 2008, ICE identified 
more than 221,000 potentially-removable aliens incarcerated nationwide.230 
DHS is sponsoring research and development in biometric technology.  
On September 21, 2009, the Unisys Corporation, working under contract with DHS and 
the Defense Information Systems Agency, announced the completion of a successful 
demonstration of sharing iris recognition biometric data across three vendor products.231  
The project demonstrated, for the first time, the ability to integrate different products, 
thus eliminating the need to limit iris recognition to a single vendor in US-VISIT.  DHS, 
Draper Laboratory and several other organizations are sponsoring a program called 
Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST).232  The FAST project, which is expected 
to be completed by 2011, will utilize thermal imaging cameras and non-invasive 
biometric sensors that monitor involuntary physiological reactions, including eye blinks, 
heart rate, respiration, nervous activity and fidgeting.233  The technology could be used 
by CBP officers at border crossings or by Transportation Security Administration 
personnel to screen personnel prior to boarding aircraft.   
2. Commercial  
Commercial companies and businesses have been at the forefront in the use of 
many biometric technologies.  Casinos, large amusement parks, banks, schools, and many 
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sports stadiums are incorporating biometric capabilities into their businesses to improve 
security, conduct crowd surveillance and minimize the possibility of theft or fraud.  
Banks are using biometric systems for physical security and ATM transactions.  Casinos 
are using biometric facial recognition systems to identify criminals and prohibit problem 
gamblers from playing casino games.  There are numerous books and journals published 
that explore the commercial applications of biometric systems.  This section is limited in 
scope, but will briefly examine how Walt Disney theme parks and schools are using 
biometric systems as a replacement to identification cards.   
a. Amusement Parks 
As an alternative to using photo identification checks, in 1996 Walt 
Disney theme parks started using biometrics, recording the geometry and shape of 
visitors’ fingers to prevent ticket fraud or resale of tickets.  In 2006, all Walt Disney 
theme parks completed a technology upgrade, replacing the geometry readers with a 
system that scans fingerprint information.  According to Kim Prunty, a Walt Disney 
World spokesperson, “the new [biometric] system will be easier for guests to use and will 
reduce wait times.”234  According to Arnold Tang, a theme park consultant, theme parks 
use biometric technology not only because it is more convenient for guests, but also 
because the systems are more accurate than photo identification cards.235  Tang stated 
about traditional photo identification checks, “There is a lot of subjectivity, and people 
can look at a photo and identify it differently.”236 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, federal government agencies sought out 
Disney’s advice on security and biometrics.  According to Jim Wayman, Director of the 
National Biometric Test Center at San Jose State University, the government may have 
wanted Disney’s expertise because Walt Disney Theme Parks are responsible for the 
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U.S.’s largest commercial application of biometrics.237  Wayman stated, “The 
government was very aware of what Disney was doing, everybody’s interested in a 
successful project.”238  Biometric industry representatives indicate that Disney has 
expressed interest in other biometric technologies, including automated facial 
recognition, which could be used to identify criminals or terrorists in large crowds.  
b. Schools 
San Diego State University (SDSU) was one of the early pioneers to use 
biometric technology instead of student identification cards to secure buildings and limit 
unauthorized access to facilities.  In 1998, SDSU purchased 12 hand geometry readers 
from Ingersoll Rand Security Technology, and installed them at six entrances of the 
SDSU’s Aztec Recreation Center and at the school’s Aquaplex.239  To access the 
facilities, the individual must be a registered student or an employee of SDSU, present 
their hand to be read by the biometric system and type in a personal identification number 
(PIN).  If the PIN matches and the hand geometry reading is verified, the individual is 
granted access to the facility.  Prior to the installation of the biometric system, students 
could easily transfer identification cards to another person for admission to the center.  
Vicki Greene, member services coordinator for SDSU, stated, “Identification card 
switching is very big in the fitness club industry, [with biometrics] no longer do members 
need to bring an identification card, this also means we don’t need to have an employee 
out front checking cards.”240   
The number of colleges installing biometric systems on campuses has 
increased in recent years.  In 2009, several University of California campuses and Baylor 
University installed hand geometry biometric systems at facility entrances to increase 
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security and improve efficiency.  According to John Atkinson, identification system 
administrator at Baylor University, “they provide security . . . it is also convenient to 
use.”241 
During school hours, many K-12 schools require adults requesting access 
to the school grounds to present a picture identification card to administrative personnel 
and sign in.  As a replacement to identification card checks, a few schools are now 
incorporating biometric systems, which not only track who is in the school, but where 
they are in the school.  In August 2009, the Boyd School, a Montessori school with seven 
locations in Northern Virginia, installed a biometric system designed to confirm the 
identity of adults entering the school, as well as track students throughout the school 
day.242  The biometric system, called BioSafe, was designed specifically for the school 
and utilizes new near-infrared hand-vein scanning hardware from Identica.243   
The BioSafe system completely digitizes the act of dropping off and 
picking up children.  Parents will present their hand to a scanner and enter a PIN into a 
touch-screen computer.  The parent enters which children they are dropping off as well as 
typing in any special instructions for the teachers.  Once the parent is approved for 
access, the parent and child are then authorized entry into the building.  The teacher 
receives notification of the student’s arrival and electronically checks them in once they 
arrive in the classroom. The teacher can subsequently check them in and out of the 
classroom throughout the day, allowing administrators knowledge of the students’ 
locations at all times.  The school is also integrating cameras into the BioSafe biometric 
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“Once a parent has checked in their child, during any type of emergency we know exactly 
who’s in the building and whom to evacuate, the system prints out the child’s picture and 
information and teachers take that out with them and make sure all kids are accounted 
for.”244  
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IV. COURSES OF ACTION 
A. ALTERNATIVES 
Analysis of alternatives is an analytical comparison of options, which identifies 
potentially viable solutions to problems.  To address the issues with driver’s licenses and 
identification cards identified by the 9/11 Commission several courses of action are 
possible.  This section will analyze the Enhanced Driver’s License  (EDL) and options 
based on information covered in previous chapters of this thesis, including: implementing 
the REAL ID Act of 2005 (RIA), repealing the RIA, replacing the RIA with the PASS ID 
Act, and establishing a national identification card standard that incorporates biometric 
technologies. 
1. Enhanced Driver’s License 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) 
mandated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State 
(DoS) develop and implement a plan to require U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to 
present a passport or other appropriate identity and citizenship documentation when 
entering the U.S. from within the Western Hemisphere by land or by sea.245  The 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) is the joint DHS and DoS plan that 
implements the requirements outlined in the IRTPA.   
In order to comply with the requirements of the WHTI, several states have begun 
to issue EDLs, and the DoS is now issuing passport cards.246  The EDLs and passport 
cards are approved alternative travel documents to a U.S. passport book for re-entry into 
the U.S. at land and sea borders when traveling from Canada, Mexico and the 
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Caribbean.247  The EDL is a dual-purpose card, which is a driver’s license that can also 
be used for re-entry at border crossings.248  DHS must approve the application, 
verification and implementation process of a state’s EDL program before a state is 
authorized to begin issuing EDLs.  The issuance of an EDL involves a more rigorous 
application process than is required to obtain a standard driver’s license.  To apply, 
applicants must present documentation showing: a valid Social Security number, U.S. 
citizenship (from original source documents, such as birth certificate), identity 
verification (a photo identification card), and residency.  In addition, they must have a 
personal interview with a licensing service representative to verify the information on the 
application.249   
a. Card Characteristics 
EDLs are required to meet the same card characteristic requirements as 
REAL IDs.  In addition, to assist with human identity verification, EDLs (like passport 
books and passport cards) are required to contain a passive radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tag.250  RFID tags contain an integrated circuit that is capable of storing a unique 
serial number or other information, and an antenna.251  The DHS standard for the EDL, 
passport books and passport cards requires that the passive RFID tags store and transmit 
only a reference number and not contain any personal identification information.  The 
RFID tags used in EDLs are low in cost, operate at 13.56 MHz, activate only when 
initiated by an RFID reader and have a limited read range of up to 30 feet.252   
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The use of RFID technology has raised concerns by privacy advocates 
who are worried that the technology is vulnerable to unauthorized tracking.  To address 
privacy concerns and limit the potential tracking range, all states issue EDLs with 
protective sleeves that are designed to shield the EDL RFID tag from being read by an 
unauthorized RFID reader.253  Researchers at the University of Washington and RSA 
Laboratories, however, found while testing the data security of EDLs that the card is 
readable under certain circumstances in a crumpled sleeve, though not in a well-
maintained sleeve.  Further, the test demonstrated that even in the protective sleeve in 
pristine condition, a reader could skim data from the RFID tag at half a yard.254 
EDLs are intended to quickly provide Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
officers the information required to process individuals crossing U.S. borders.  As 
individuals holding EDLs, passport books and passport cards approach a border patrol 
agent booth, they are instructed to remove the RFID-enabled travel documents from their 
protective sleeves and hold them outside their vehicle windows.255  The passive RFID tag 
will receive the frequency coming from a border booth RFID receiver and then begin 
broadcasting the tag’s unique identification number.  The receiver will acquire the 
identification number and send the information to a secure database system for lookup.256  
If a match occurs, the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Officer can pull up biographic 
and biometric data associated with the number and initiate verification of the identity of 
the approaching individual.257  In the event that the RFID tag does not register with  
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information stored in the database, the CBP can scan and read the Machine Readable 
Zone (MRZ) or barcode that is required on all passport books, passport cards and 
EDLs.258 
b. Current Status 
Currently, only U.S. citizens living in Michigan, New York, Vermont and 
Washington State have the option to obtain an EDL.  The EDL costs $15 to $30 more 
than standard driver’s licenses, but provides a more convenient and less expensive option 
than a passport book, which costs $100 and can take months to obtain due to a backlog of 
requests at the DoS.259  As of May 12, 2009, thousands of EDLs had been issued, with 
New York having issued 73,000, Washington over 56,000, Michigan 1,600 and Vermont 
2,400.260  To facilitate trade and tourism between the U.S. and Canada, four Canadian 
provinces, including British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec, have worked with 
DHS to develop and produce EDLs.261  As of May 2009, 12,000 EDLs had been issued 
by the four Canadian Provinces.262 
c. Assessment 
States issuing EDLs require applicants to provide original source 
documents for verification of U.S. citizenship, but the data in the EDL is only as good as 
the source documents.  The source document verification process may prohibit some 
illegal immigrants and criminals from acquiring EDLs, although source documents, such 
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as a birth certificate, may be easier to counterfeit than many other identity documents.  A 
skilled criminal or terrorist may be able to supply counterfeit source documents and 
obtain an EDL.  Requiring fingerprints would provide an additional level of security to 
the background checks and establish whether the applicant has a criminal status, which 
could be identified by checking the FBI’s IAFIS, the DHS’s US-VISIT, and other federal 
records databases.   
The cost to produce, implement and manage EDL programs is relatively 
low.  The EDL is valid for 8 years, making the cost to individuals, based on a maximum 
additional cost of $30 per issuance, less than $3.75 per year.  As an example of the 
implementation costs, which are in addition to the card costs, Vermont was able to fully 
implement an EDL program at a cost of $1 million.263  However, Vermont is only able to 
issue EDLs at one DMV location and the state has a very small population, around 
621,000 people.264  Implementation of an EDL-type identification program on a national 
level, to cover the 245 million driver’s license and identification card holders, is 
estimated to cost at least several hundreds of millions of dollars.265 
DHS has addressed privacy concerns by requiring states to use passive 
RFID tags, that contain no personal information, and advising states to issue EDLs with 
protective sleeves to limit the RFID tag’s tracking range.  Even if the RFID tag 
information is extracted by an unauthorized RFID reader, the only information that could 
be obtained is the RFID tag’s unique identification number.   
RFID tags are a viable alternative to barcode technology, which is 
currently used by most states to store information on driver’s licenses and identification 
cards.  In the U.S., there are currently millions of RFID-enabled identification documents 
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in use.  In 2008, the DoS issued over 15 million RFID passport books.266  As of May 
2009, over 1 million RFID passport cards have been issued.267  By 2017, all of the 70 
million U.S. passports in circulation will have been replaced with an RFID-enabled 
identification document.268  As more Americans obtain RFID-enabled passport 
identification documents, and become accustomed to using RFID technology, public 
acceptance of the technology should increase and privacy concerns decrease.   
EDLs are considered more secure than standard driver’s licenses and 
identification cards, but still have vulnerabilities, such as reliance on a photograph and 
biographical information to establish identity, which could be exploited by criminals and 
terrorists.  Photographs can be altered easily, and also depend on humans to make 
matches.  During the 8 years that an EDL is valid, if an individual changes their 
appearance, matching the EDL photograph to the individual becomes a challenge.  
Adding more rigorous verification checks, fingerprints or other biometrics would further 
secure EDLs. 
2. REAL ID ACT 
Chapter II included a comprehensive analysis of the costs, benefits, privacy 
concerns and proponent and opponent arguments for and against the RIA.  The RIA 
fulfills a key 9/11 Commission recommendation requiring states to meet minimum 
security standards for issuance, and outlines the standard required for a driver’s license to 
be accepted for federal purposes.  Factors that limit the effectiveness of the RIA in fully 
addressing the 9/11 Commission recommendations are that the RIA is voluntary, and 
does not limit states on the types of identification cards that can be issued or to whom 
they may issue them.  Similar to EDLs, reliance on a photograph as the primary biometric 
is a major vulnerability since the use of photographs alone may not be sufficient to secure 
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driver’s licenses and identification cards.  Adding a requirement to the RIA to incorporate 
additional biometric indicators in driver’s licenses and identification cards would 
improve on a well-intended legislative effort to address the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations. 
In 2008, DHS granted $17 million to Mississippi, Wisconsin and Florida to 
partner in a program that would help other states meet the information sharing 
requirements of the RIA, including integration of DMV databases.269  Privacy advocates 
are concerned that the RIA requirement to link state DMV databases creates a tool the 
federal government could use to conduct surveillance on legal residents, and that the 
large databases would be vulnerable to theft and hackers.  However, the requirement to 
integrate state DMV databases provides a mechanism to assist states with identifying 
criminals and terrorists, like the 9/11 terrorists, who attempted to acquire multiple 
driver’s licenses from multiple states.  DHS should continue to fund this effort as it is 
critical to the success of the RIA or any alternative identification system reform efforts. 
3. REPEAL REAL ID ACT 
Repealing the RIA would not address any of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations.  Fifteen states have passed legislation prohibiting implementation of 
RIA requirements, but the current political environment and makeup of the Senate and 
Congress does not make repealing the RIA and replacing it with nothing a likely course 
of action.  According to Janice Kephart, a former member of the 9/11 Commission and 
director of national security policy at the Center for Immigration Studies, “As much as 
the Senate has not liked REAL ID I don’t think any senator wants to be pinned with 
rolling back a 9/11 Commission recommendation.”270  Since several states will not meet 
the RIA material compliance requirements prior to the January 2010 deadline, it is  
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probable that RIA will be amended or replaced with alternative legislation; otherwise, 
residents of these states may not be able to board aircraft or may be forced to undergo 
additional airport security measures. 
4. PASS ID ACT 
Proponents argue that the PASS ID Act is a more flexible approach to securing 
driver’s licenses and identification cards.  Opponents argue that it repeals substantive 
components of the REAL ID Act, freezing standards as they are today to save costs 
instead of strengthening standards to improve national security.  DHS has not provided a 
detailed cost breakdown of the PASS ID Act, but initial estimates indicate the bill would 
cost the states less than the RIA.  The PASS ID Act requires the same driver’s license and 
identification card characteristics as the RIA.  A photograph is the primary biometric 
identifier, three levels of integrated security features are required and a 2-D barcode will 
contain the same information as in a REAL ID card.  The cost savings features of the 
PASS ID Act eliminate the requirement for information sharing among state DMV 
databases, weaken airport security and allow states options to make identity verification 
determinations.  The PASS ID Act would eliminate grants to states to facilitate 
information sharing and replace the program with a demonstration project that may not 
produce any useful system.271  Since the RIA became law, the PASS ID Act is the only 
driver’s license and identification card reform bill to make it out of a Senate or 
Congressional Committee, but it is not known whether PASS ID has enough public and 
political support to pass a full Senate and House of Representatives vote.   
5. NATIONAL BIOMETRIC-BASED ID SYSTEM 
The following subsections examine the use of multimodal biometrics with a 
national identification card and the suitability of alternative biometrics technologies. 
                                                 
271 Spencer Hsu, Administration Plans to Scale Back REAL ID Law, June 14, 2009. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/13/AR2009061302036.html (accessed 
September 21, 2009). 
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a. Multimodal Biometric Identification 
A multimodal biometric system consolidates information from multiple 
biometric sources, providing better performance than identification systems like state 
driver’s license and identification cards systems that utilize a single biometric modality, 
i.e., the face.  As highlighted in Chapter III, biometric systems based on a single 
modality, such as face, finger or iris, are not 100% accurate because of sensor issues, lack 
of distinctiveness of the biometric trait, unacceptable error rates and spoof attacks.272  
Multimodal biometric systems can overcome many of these problems by combining 
multiple attributes or pieces of evidence about an individual to create a more 
comprehensive picture.273  Multimodalities also can drastically reduce the size of the 
non-enrollable population, because of the unlikelihood that the same individual will have 
problems with all biometric indicators.274   
The U.S. has demonstrated the willingness, knowledge and capability to 
implement large-scale multimodal biometric identification systems.  The DoD ABIS 
contains 3 million records (fingerprints, iris scans and biographical metrics) from 
residents, criminals and terrorists from Iraq and Afghanistan.  The DHS US-VISIT 
program requires visitors to the U.S. to provide 10 fingerprints and a photograph, and 
contains millions of biometric records.  The FBI is implementing the Next Generation 
Identification program, a multimodal biometric system that will contain the 57 million 
fingerprints contained in IAFIS, along with photographs and other biometric indicators.  
DoD, DHS and the FBI are working towards making the databases interoperable.  Once 
completed, the databases would provide a valuable resource for identifying criminals and 
terrorists trying to illegally obtain driver’s licenses and identification cards.   
                                                 
272 Anil K. Jain, “Mutilmodal Interfaces that Flex, Adapt and Persist,” Communications of the ACM, 
2004, Volume 47, Issue 1: 34–40, 37–38.   
273 Anil Jain, Karthik Nandakumar and Arun Ross, “Score Normalization in Multimodal Biometric 
Systems,” Pattern Recognition: The Journal of the Pattern Recognition Society, 2005: 2270–2285, 2283. 
274 Damien Dessimoz, Jonas Richiardi, Christophe Champod and Andrzej Drygajlo, “Multimodal 
Biometrics for Identity Documents,” Forensic Science International , 2006: 154–159, 155. 
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Currently, India recognizes 20 different proofs of identity, such as ration 
cards, passports, birth certificates, and driver’s licenses, yet many poor individuals have 
no form of identification and are unable to open a bank account or apply for government 
assistance.  To address the problem of large numbers of citizens who currently have no 
proof of identity, assist with illegal immigration policy enforcement and help guard 
against foreign terrorists, including the Pakistanis that launched a commando attack on 
Mumbai, India, has initiated a national multimodal biometric identification program.275  
Within the next five years, India will provide all 1.2 billion citizens with a national 
identity number, similar to a Social Security number, and a biometric identity card.276  
The biometric identity card will have finger, face and iris biometric information.  The 
data will be stored online, creating the largest biometric database in the world.277  India’s 
development of a multimodal biometric identification system to support 1.2 billion 
people is an indication that the technology is scalable to support very large populations, 
as would be required to support a U.S. national identification system.  Development of a 
multimodal biometric driver’s license and identification card system within the U.S. is a 
viable technical option. 
b. Biometric Alternatives  
This section briefly analyzes whether the biometric technologies identified 
as being best suited for use in national security and border security purposes are viable 
options for incorporation into a national identification system.  Fingerprinting has been 
used for decades and poll data indicates that public acceptance of fingerprinting is very 
high.  The cost of the technology is low.  In an effort to better control access to theme 
parks, and address the inherent vulnerabilities with use of photograph identification 
cards, Walt Disney theme parks have been using fingerprints to secure access to parks for 
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over a decade.  The FBI, DHS and DoD have demonstrated that fingerprints can be used 
to identify criminals and terrorists.  Government databases contain fingerprints from 
millions of individuals, including criminals and terrorist suspects, and could be used to 
assist with verification checks of all driver’s license and identification card applicants.  
Fingerprinting technology is a viable option for a multimodal biometric national 
identification system. 
Implementation costs are low, but there are several challenges with using 
hand geometry systems in a national identification system.  There are not any large-scale 
government databases of hand geometry prints, and the fact that 1 in 100 individuals have 
similar hand geometry does not make hand geometry a viable option for use in a system 
that would need to distinguish the identity of millions of people.  When compared to 
fingerprints, implementing a hand geometry system would be more challenging and 
might not provide the desired result, which is to improve national security. 
The only large government databases containing iris scan biometric data is 
DoD’s ABIS.  Iris recognition systems have higher implementation costs, but iris systems 
do have an advantage in accuracy over both fingerprint and hand geometry systems.  
Another advantage to iris scan technology is that no contact with the sensor equipment is 
required.  In an era of the H1N1 flu and concerns about pandemics, Americans might 
support spending additional resources to implement a highly accurate system that does 
not require contact.  Implementation of iris scan technology nation-wide for use in a 
national identification system is a viable technical option, but would require a larger 
financial investment by states and the federal government than fingerprint technology. 
Facial recognition does not require physical contact with a sensor, but the 
accuracy is affected by changes in lighting and obstructions such as hats, glasses or 
changes in appearance.  The Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) has effectively 
demonstrated that facial recognition technology can play a role in resolving identity theft.  
In an effort to apprehend wanted criminals, the FBI has begun using facial recognition 
technology to scan millions of North Carolina state driver’s license photos to identify 
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possible matches with pictures of wanted criminals.278  State and federal laws allow 
driver’s license agencies to release records for law enforcement purposes, but the FBI is 
not authorized to store the photos.279  Therefore, facial recognition analysis must be done 
at state DMVs.  Facial recognition is a low-cost, viable, supplemental tool that could be 
used by law enforcement agencies and state DMVs to help identify identity thieves and 
wanted criminals. 
B. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES 
Table 3 includes a side-by-side comparison of the alternatives.  The comparison 
of alternatives is based on an assessment of the card cost over an eight-year period, how 
effectively the course of action is expected to improve security including how the option 
would be expected to protect identity theft, implementation feasibility, whether the option 
would be implemented with a central database or require integration of existing 
databases, primary biometric indicator required, card data storage method, assessment of 
political viability, and how the option would increase the cost to counterfeiting.  
Attributes for some of the characteristics are classified as low, medium and high as an 
indicator of how each alternative addresses the characteristics.  The national 
identification using biometrics incorporates key components from REAL ID and EDL 
programs, including: database integration, RFID tag’s and source document verification 
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All states issue driver’s licenses and identification cards, and it could be argued 
that because all the states honor each other’s cards, there already exists a national 
identification standard.  A problem is that the current standard has vulnerabilities that can 
be exploited by criminals and terrorists, just as the 9/11 terrorists did.  The RIA, and the 
recently-introduced PASS ID Act, address aspects of securing driver’s license and 
identification cards, but reliance on a photograph as a biometric indicator is not sufficient 
to assist law enforcement and homeland security professionals with identifying criminals 
and terrorists before they strike.  The economic impacts of another terrorist attack of the 
magnitude of 9/11 to the U.S. over two years are estimated at $374.7 billion.280  
Preventing another 9/11-magnitude terrorist attack and making identity theft difficult for 
criminals is in the national interest of all Americans.   
As identity theft continues to rise each year, with costs in the billions of dollars, 
Americans are looking for ways to protect their identity from criminals.  Relying on a 
driver’s license with a photograph or a Social Security card with a number does not 
provide sufficient security for Americans.  With no single trusted credential for all 
Americans, there is a need to implement a credential that can be presented and 
universally accepted for identification.  This thesis argues that, based on the options 
available, utilizing biometric technology to secure driver’s licenses and identification 
cards would provide a solution that addresses both national security issues and the types 
of identity theft requiring the presentation of a driver’s license.   
The 9/11 terrorist attacks forced the U.S. government and citizens to examine how 
civil liberties should be balanced against implementing new security measures that would 
improve national security.  With a national biometric identification system, it will be 
harder for anyone to use someone else’s driver’s license or identification card.  
Therefore, establishing a national biometric-based driver’s license and identification card 
                                                 
280 Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Act Regulatory Evaluation - Final Rulemaking, 
Report Identification Number: 1601-AA37, Washington D.C.: DHS, January 17, 2008, 134. 
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can be viewed as a privacy-enhancing technology.  Professor Alan Dershowitz of the 
Harvard Law School, described by Newsweek as “the nation’s most peripatetic civil 
liberties lawyer and one of the most distinguished defenders of individual rights,” stated: 
Before 11 September 2001, I had not thought much about national identity 
cards.  I had a knee jerk opposition to any such intrusion, growing 
primarily out of the misuse of identification cards by the apartheid regime 
in South Africa and the totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and China.  
But, the ease with which the 11 September hijackers managed to hide in 
open view and fall between the bureaucratic cracks made it clear to me 
that a foolproof national identification card had some real virtues.  Then I 
started to think about the vices.  I was hard pressed to come up with any 
compelling civil libertarian arguments against a simple card which would 
contain only five elements: the bearer’s name, address, Social Security 
number, photograph, and a finger or retinal print matching a chip in the 
card…We must start thinking smartly about smart technology that can 
increase our security without unduly diminishing our liberty.  We need not 
fear technology, so long as we control it, rather than allowing it to control 
us.281   
The U.S. government has a responsibility to protect the nation from terrorist 
attack.  “Balancing the equities involved and depending on the case, the benefits to the 
individual as well as the society of establishing a person’s identity generally outweigh the 
costs of losing anonymity.”282  Knowing if the individual standing in front of you is who 
they claim to be is critical in all national security settings, whether it is screening to allow 
someone to board an aircraft or screening for driver’s license eligibility.   
The bottom line is, even with REAL ID or PASS ID, it would be easier to get on 
an airplane than to enter a Walt Disney theme park with an expired Disney biometrics 
based-access pass.  Biographical information such as phone number, address and age as 
required on REAL IDs and PASS IDs may assist businesses and government agencies at 
some level with identifying individuals, but a better way to match an identification card 
with an individual would be to include additional biometric information.  
                                                 
281 Alan Dershowitz, Thinking About National ID Cards, May 2002. 
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My recommendation is to implement a national biometric identification card and 
would require implementation of several components, all of which are currently being 
implemented in part by some states and federal agencies, but have yet to be implemented 
on a national level.  First, standardize the requirements for state driver’s licenses and 
identification cards using RIA as a baseline, but include fingerprint and iris information, 
and make the requirements compulsory for states.  Second, implement procedures to 
verify citizenship status prior to driver’s license issuance, using source documents such 
as birth certificates, a requirement which is already required for EDLs and REAL IDs.  
Third, continue to integrate state DMV and federal government biometric databases, and 
encourage the use of facial recognition systems as a tool to identify identity thieves.  
Fourth, increase the federal grant funding to assist states with initial implementation.  
There are legislative, policy, and funding hurdles that need to be overcome before 
any national identification system might be successfully implemented.  The easy part for 
government agencies is the collection of biometric data; the hard part is how to manage 
the information and share it across federal agencies that have different regulations and 
reasons for collecting it.283  These hurdles are not insurmountable, and can be overcome 
with sufficient interagency cooperation, legislative and public support.  Public opinion 
has consistently supported implementing a national identification card system.  
Immediately after 9/11 and through the latest public opinion poll conducted in 2006, polls 
showed that between fifty-six and seventy percent of the American public supported a 
national identification card.284   
The way ahead will need to be decided by U.S. citizens, the legislature and the 
executive branch, but there are clear alternatives, some with more security vulnerabilities 
than others.  The U.S. has the technology and capability to implement a biometric 
technology solution to better secure driver’s licenses and identification cards, but has not 
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been successful in implementing a robust solution similar to what India is embarking on 
and other countries have already implemented.  Let us hope that it does not take another 
attack of the magnitude of 9/11 for the U.S. to implement a comprehensive solution 
utilizing all of the technological tools at our disposal. 
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APPENDIX.  REAL ID ACT MATERIAL COMPLIANCE 
CHECKLIST285 
1. Mandatory facial image and retention 
2. Declaration of true and correct information 
3. Require an individual to present at least one of the source documents for 
identity 
4. Require documentation of date of birth; Social Security Number; address 
of principle residence; evidence of lawful status 
5. Have a documented exceptions process 
6. Reasonable efforts to make sure the individual does not have more than 
one license 
7. Verify lawful status through the Systematic Alien Verification for 
Entitlements (SAVE) program or another DHS approved method  
8. Verify Social Security Numbers with Social Security Administration or 
other DHS approved method 
9. Issue driver’s licenses that contain Level 1, 2, and 3 integrated security 
features 
10. Surface of cards include full legal name, date of birth, gender, unique 
license number, full facial digital photograph, address of principal 
residence, signature, date of transaction, expiration date, and state or 
territory of issuance 
11. Commit to mark materially compliant license with DHS approved security 
marking 
12. Issue temporary or limited-term licenses to all individuals with temporary 
lawful status  
                                                 
285 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Impact of Implementation: A 
Review of the REAL ID Act and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, The Material Compliance 
Checklist, April 29, 2008. 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=c8bd6312-5714-4a1c-
8f25-eef90c611a44, p. 360-361. (accessed July 1, 2009).    
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13. Have a documented security plan for Department of Motor Vehicle 
(DMV) operations 
14. Have protections in place to ensure security of personally identifiable 
information 
15. Require all employees handling source documents or issuing licenses to 
attend security awareness and fraudulent document recognition program  
16. Conduct name based and fingerprint based criminal history check of DMV 
employees 
17. Commit to be in material compliance with subparts A-D of the final 
regulations by January 1, 2010 or within 90 days of submitting this 
document 
18. Clearly state on the face of non-compliant licenses that the card is not 
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